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Ludger Kühnhardt 
Maturing beyond Cotonou: An EU-ACP 
Association Treaty for Development 
A proposal for reinventing EU relations with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States 
I. Time for a strategic maturation  
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, 
Caribbean, Pacific Group of States (ACP) is one of the most unknown, 
underperforming and underrated legal arrangements in the world. However, 
all things considered, the EU-ACP relationship has the potential to be of 
great value. It can be of growing importance if it is properly placed in the 
context of foreseeable global trends. For this, the European Union and its 
ACP partners need to be bold and forward looking, strategic and geo-
political. The EU-ACP relationship can become much more relevant for 
coping with a rising number of global issues. So much so, that it would 
need to be invented if it did not already exist today. Taken together, the 28 
EU member states 1  and 79 ACP countries 2  constitute more than fifty 
 
1 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. 
2 Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the 
Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe;  
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percent of the 193 UN member states. They represent a wide range of states 
– from some of the strongest economies to some of the weakest; from some 
of the biggest states demographically to some of the smallest states on 
earth; from highly complex and resilient democracies and technologically 
advanced societies to some of the most vulnerable societies and residual 
states.  
In its own way, the EU-ACP grouping is a mini-United Nations with three 
unique features:  
• The EU-ACP grouping represents the transformation from an 18th and 
19th century world of imperialist powers and peripheral colonies to a 
21st century world of honest partnership between countries of the 
global North and of the global South.  
• The EU-ACP grouping represents rule-based North-South relations as 
they have advanced in the course of the 20th century with a legally 
binding common agenda for development, trade and political 
dialogue.  
• The EU-ACP grouping anticipates and paves the way towards legally 
binding interactions among the various state groupings in a multipolar 
and multilateral 22nd century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba (did not sign 
the 2000 Cotonou Agreement), Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago;  
Pacific: Cook Islands, Timor-Leste, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated 
States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu (see map on the next page). 
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But in order to make use of its potential, the EU-ACP relationship has to be 
reinvented and substantially upgraded. It will either mature or perish. Such 
maturation of the grouping is desirable and possible. A maturation of the 
EU-ACP partnership can happen: “this paper suggests” that the current 
Cotonou Agreement should be replaced in 2020 by an innovative, strategic 
and legally binding EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development. A 
genuine association (and only a genuine, treaty-based association!) between 
the 28 EU countries and 79 or (if Cuba also signs a new treaty) 80 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries will have the potential to become an 
important pillar for a human-centered reinterpretation of geo-politics.     
The EU-ACP grouping anticipates the global world order of tomorrow by 
representing the diversity of the global age of today. The world of 
tomorrow will be defined by a global order which includes the experience 
of the European Union and of many of the ACP states. The world order of 
tomorrow will be a world order looking for pillars of stability and for actors 
which can predictably generate norms and project leadership. To a great 
extent, the world order of tomorrow will be managed by the United States 
of America, by the EU and by China. They are the strongest economic 
actors and as such have a great responsibility to project stability in the 
service of human progress beyond their borders. For the EU, this requires 
advancing a treaty-based relationship with its principal economic and 
strategic partner, the US. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), currently being negotiated against the backdrop of 
controversial public debates, is meant to give meaning to this objective. 
Regarding China, the EU is – rightly so – advocating an ever increasing 
inclusion of the single most populated country on earth into the relevant 
global structures; instead of seeing China as a problematic competitor or 
even adversary, the EU considers China primarily as a partner in the search 
for multipolar stability and enhanced multilateralism. But the EU is not 
only involved with the United States and with China. The promotion of 
legally binding, norm-based and enforceable mechanisms of governance in 
other global partnerships is an essential test-case for the ability of the EU to 
project its claim of being a pillar of stability in a multipolar world. The 
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relationship of the European Union with the ACP Group of States is the 
single most important test case for promoting the idea of a legally binding, 
norm based and multidimensional partnership across four continents.  
In the age of globality – which is gradually turning the experience of 
globalization from a process into an unfinished reality – the world at large 
is experiencing a higher degree of interconnectedness than ever before. But 
the world is also experiencing a higher degree of contradictions between 
human promise and practical delivery, between success and failure, 
between rising opportunities and an enhanced sense of humiliation by those 
left behind, between global fusions and local identity clashes. The world is 
facing the challenges of unfinished globalization.  
Growing forms of actor-ness across the globe underpin the long-term 
sociological discussion of individualization in Western societies: Today, 
almost every citizen of the earth can consider herself or himself an actor in 
their own right – including the ability to execute an enhanced potential of 
veto and destruction. More actors as agents of change provide more owners 
of the future of mankind, promoters of genuine interests and new forms of 
veto-capacity. As part of this trend, the rising actor-ness in former colonies 
is equivalent to the phenomenon of a decolonization of the post-colonial 
era. But these new realities also exacerbate the challenges which come with 
this long-term process: demographic trends, enhanced bargaining powers, 
expanding policy options and the tensions arising from incomplete and 
progress which is not sustained.  
Against this backdrop, the time has come to graduate the EU-ACP 
relationship from a donor-recipient development aid policy relationship 
with post-colonial overtures to a political – in the true sense of the word: a 
geo-political-factor. Time has come to graduate the EU-ACP relationship 
into a viable contribution to advance the idea of a multipolar and 
multilateral global order which is inclusive and advances human dignity 
around the globe. This is easier said than done in light of the huge 
economic asymmetries between the two groupings: The European Union 
includes 7.3 percent of the global population (about 508 million people), 
accounting for 25.8 percent of the world’s GDP and contributing 35.5 
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percent of global trade. The ACP Group of States includes 14 percent of 
the global population (about 933 million people), accounting for 1.9 
percent of the world’s GDP and contributing 4.7 percent of global trade. 
Traditionally, the EU-ACP relationship – the only legally-based regional 
arrangement stretching over four continents – is considered merely as a 
component of global development policies. At best, it is measured by each 
other’s trade relevance: “In 2012, the ACP figured as the EU’s fifth most 
important trading partner, loosely followed by ASEAN and far behind the 
USA, China, European Free Trade Association and Russia... For the ACP 
countries, the EU as a group remained the most important single trading 
partner, despite a dramatic increase of their trade with China.”3 If the EU-
ACP grouping wants to have any meaning in the future, it must become a 
leading contributor to a human-centered redefinition of geopolitics. The 
EU-ACP grouping must become geo-political in the true meaning of the 
word.  
In order to do so, the EU-ACP grouping needs to be re-conceptualized in 
terms of its strategic relevance. This is the only way forward for the EU-
ACP grouping to substantially contribute to a better world for all. The 
current frame for the EU-ACP relationship – the 2000 Cotonou Agreement 
(EU-ACP Partnership Agreement) – will expire on February 29, 2020. The 
time has come for a bold new reflection on the potential and the obstacles 
ahead for EU-ACP relations. The origins of this unique grouping – 
stretching over four continents and touching on practically every region 
and on any number of possible topics of global relevance – go back to 
1975. Forty years later, as the world has changed almost beyond 
recognition, the actors of the EU-ACP relationship have to be ambitious 
enough to project their perspectives into the next forty years. Today, the 
EU-ACP grouping has to live up to its potential by charting the waters it 
will sail until 2055 and beyond. In the real world, the search for a new 
rationale will produce only gradual results. Yet, it must start with the 
recognition of each other’s comprehensive actor-capacity. And it must start 
 
3 Elisabeth Pape, An old Partnership in a New Setting: ACP-EU Relations from a 
European Perspective, in: Journal of International Development, Volume 25, Issue 
5/2013, p. 736. 
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with learning from one’s own post-colonial past in order to harness the 
transformed global context of today.  
The ACP Group of States started the process first: Since the ACP Summit 
in Malabo in 2012 (‘Sipopo Declaration’), an Eminent Persons group of 
politicians and academics from the ACP regions has reflected on possible 
post-Cotonou options4 and developed a strategy for the renewal of the ACP 
aimed at strengthening its role as a global player; the final report of this 
ACP Eminent Persons group was published in 2014.5 Now, the European 
Union began to act, too: In autumn 2014, EU Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker gave the mandate to his Commissioner for International 
Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, for “preparing and 
launching negotiations for a revised Cotonou agreement”.6 In the end, this 
will come down to the issue of financial commitment by the EU: For the 
period 2014 until 2020, the EU is financing most of the ACP infrastructure 
(including the Groups Secretariat in Brussels) and much of its activities 
 
4 See Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ed.), Strategy 
for Renewal and Transformation 2011-2014, Brussels: Secretariat of the ACP 
Group of States, 2011, online at: www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/Strategy% 
 20for%20Renewal%20and%20Transformation%202011-2014.pdf.; Miriam Van 
Reisen, Study on the Future Perspectives of the ACP Group, ACP Secretariat 
Report, 05/2014, online at: www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/ ACP27017 
 %2012%20ENG%20 VanReisen.pdf.; see also: Andris Piebalgs, Challenges and 
opportunities ahead for the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States. Speech 
by EU Commissioner Piebalgs, delivered at the ACP Summit in Malabo, 13 
December 2012, online at: www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_12958_en.htm.  
5 Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ed.), 
Transforming the ACP Group into an Effective Global Player. Final Report of the 
Ambassadorial Working Group on the Future Perspectives of the African Caribbean  
 and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, Brussels: Secretariat of the ACP Group of 
States, 2014, online at: www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/WGFP%20Final 
 %20Report_EN.pdf; for an substantial analysis of the global context in which the 
ACP Group of States has to be interpreted, see Guy Marcel Nono, The future of the 
ACP Group of States in a changing world: Challenges and future perspectives, in: 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 23.1(2015): 29-53. 
6 Mission Letter of EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to Commissioner 
for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, Brussels, 
November 1, 2014, online at: www.ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019 
/mimica_en. 
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across the three ACP regions. Roughly 31.5 billion euro is allocated to 
ACP-related activities through the 11th European Development Fund. But 
the EU-ACP relationship is more than a one-sided fiscal constellation.  
First and foremost, it is a political relationship and has to be assessed as 
such. Academic and political stock-taking has begun accordingly, primarily 
within the existing parameters of the current Cotonou Agreement signed in 
2000.7  
An innovative new approach must go beyond: The starting point for a 
strategic reinvention of the EU-ACP grouping must be thematic. 
Institutions tend to focus on institutional overhauls, at best. Pragmatism is 
on their side, as well as the weight of negotiation legitimacy. But an in-
depth intellectual reflection on the future coordinates in which EU-ACP 
relations may thrive needs to go beyond the opportunities and constraints of 
an institutional overhaul. Such a reflection must look at topics, identify 
themes and project trends. This will give substance and perspective to 
policy negotiations and technical considerations. Before carving out such a 
broad picture for projecting into the EU-ACP future, it is imperative to 
recall the key parameters and experiences of the first forty years of EU-
ACP relations.  
  
 
7 Dietmar Nickel, Was kommt nach Cotonou? Die Zukunft der Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen der EU und den Afrika-,Karibik- und Pazifikstaaten. SWP-Studie S 13, 
Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2012, online at: www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2012_S13_nic.pdf; Deutsches 
Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (ed.), AKP-EU-Beziehungen nach 2020: Auf der 
Suche nach einer europäischen Haltung Bonn: Deutsches Institut für 
Entwicklungspolitik, 2013, online at: www.die-gdi.de/CMSHomepage/openweb 
 cms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ANES98JE6T/$FILE/AuS%205.2013.pdf.; 
 Manuel Manrique Gil, ACP-EU relations after 2020: Review of options, Policy 
briefing, Brussels: European Commission, Directorate General for external policies, 
2013, online at: www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/ 
join/2013/491488/EXPO-DEVE_SP(2013)491488_EN.pdf. 
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II. Colonial and post-colonial legacies from Rome to Lomé  
For the time being, EU-ACP relations are still organized in the shadow of 
their colonial and post-colonial beginnings.8 With the establishment of the 
European Economic Community in 1957, a formalized association was 
established between the emerging European common market and the 
overseas territories and colonies of its member states. France with its two 
colonial empires in Africa and the ongoing inclusion of Algeria as an 
integral part of the French republic, but also Belgium with its colonial rule 
over Congo and Italy with its trust-territory Somaliland demanded the 
association of their African possessions.9 Reluctantly, Germany accepted 
the association status while insisting on its preference for decolonization 
and self-determination. The Treaties of Rome (Article 131,1) laid the 
ground for the association of the EEC with the overseas territories of its 
member states, establishing the first European Development Fund 
(guaranteeing $581 million for the period 1959-1964 in support of 
investment in the overseas territories), aimed at supporting the process of 
market development in the overseas territories, and facilitating access of 
African products into the emerging European Economic Community. 
Following the wave of independence movements across Africa during the 
late 1950s/early 1960s, the association approach came to an end. The 
Yaoundé Agreement of 196310 (and its successor arrangement, the Yaoundé 
 
8 David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas 
Empire 1915- 1980, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000; Morten Broberg, The EU’s 
Legal Ties with its Former Colonies. When Old Love Never Dies, DIIS Working 
Paper, No. 1, Kopenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011, online 
at: www.subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2011/WP2011-02%20til%20 
tryk.pdf.; Daniela Vogt, Die Integration der ultra-peripheren Regionen in die 
Europäische Union. Wandel der europäischen Politik gegenüber den überseeischen 
Besitzungen von Rom (1957) bis Lissabon (2009), Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011. 
9 On the French discourse see Marie-Thérèse Bitsch/Gérard Bossuat (eds.), L’Europe 
unie et l’Afrique. De l’idée d'Eurafrique à la Convention de Lomé I, Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 2005. 
10 In force from 1964 to 1969 and signed with 18 independent African countries: 
Burundi, Dahomey, Democratic Republic Congo, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo-
Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Upper Volta, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Chad, Central African Republic.  
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II Agreement of 197111) echoed the experiences of the first few years with 
the double objective of aid and trade, while giving more institutional 
structure to the EEC/EC 12 - (independent) Africa link: An Association 
Council, a Parliamentary Conference and an Arbitration Court could not 
however overcome the asymmetric trade and power relationship between 
the EEC and its independent partners tied together by customs free access 
to the European market. Colonial rule over much of Africa had come to an 
end and the association shifted toward post-colonial parameters, that is to 
say: formal independence for the African countries coupled with continued 
economic dependency and burning “underdevelopment” issues (extreme 
poverty and a lack of economic production beyond the level of 
subsistence). The transformation of France’s role in Africa is symbolized 
by the change in the meaning of the term CFA used for the African 
currency CFA franc to this day: From Communauté Franco-Africaine franc 
(established in 1945) to Communauté Financière Africaine (existing since 
1994 as the West African CFA franc under the auspices of the Economic 
and Monetary Community of West African States (UEMOA) and as the 
Central African CFA franc under the auspices of the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC). 13  The 
 
11 In force from 1972 to 1975 and additionally signed by Mauritius, while the planned 
membership of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda (initiated with the Arusha Agreement of 
July 26, 1968 which was never ratified by the three member states of the East 
African Community) and of Nigeria (planned by the Lagos Agreement of 
Cooperation of July 16, 1966 but torpedoed by the effects of the Biafra War 1967-
1970) did not work out as expected, in spite of the strong interest of Great Britain, 
who joined the EEC in 1973, to extend special relations to Anglophone countries in 
Africa. 
12 The fusion treaties between the European Economic Community, Euratom and the 
European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS) of 1967 turned the EEC into the 
EC (European Communities). 
13 The literature on the CFA franc and the effect of being pegged to the euro  is 
surprisingly limited: see David Stasavage, The Political Economy of a Common 
Currency: The CFA Franc Zone Since 1945, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003; Pierre Van 
den Boogaerde/Tsangarides Charalambros, Ten Years After the CFA Franc 
Devaluation: Progress Toward Regional Integration in the WAEMU, Washington 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2005; Ali Zafar, The Impact of the Strong Euro 
on the Real Effective Exchange Rates of the Two Francophone African CFA 
Zones, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005. 
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transformation of the British role in Europe as well as in Africa was 
symbolized by British membership in the European Community (EC) in 
1973 (along with Ireland and Denmark) and the expansion of the Yaoundé 
Agreement through a new arrangement with an initial 46 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific states in 1975.  
Signed in the capital of Togo, Lomé, the preferential trade agreement of 
1975 reflected not only changes in EC relations with former colonies, but 
also global North-South debates in the shadow of a growing awareness of 
the limits of growth (Club of Rome Report, 1972) and the oil crisis of 1973. 
One special feature of the effect of Franco-British reconciliation inside 
Europe was the establishment of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in 1975, bringing together for the first time 
Francophone and Anglophone countries in Africa under the umbrella of 
one regional economic community. Another feature was the Georgetown 
Agreement, also signed in 1975 by the 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific 
signatory states to the Lomé Convention, thus founding the ACP Group of 
States.14 Commonwealth links ensured that six Caribbean and three Pacific 
states (the majority of them Anglophone and reasonably stable, 
Westminster-type democracies) extended the geographical scope of the 
EC-Africa policy by creating the ACP group; the ACP group, in turn, 
helped the EC to rationalize its partnership with the geographically widely 
spread group of former colonies and overseas territories. British EC 
membership was gave the hope of a stronger free trade orientation in EC 
relations with the developing world, while in reality the protectionist 
French approach to the post-colonial relationship since the association 
under the Rome Treaties did not wither away. In fact, it continued to 
dominate EC-ACP ties: The Lomé Convention of 1975 (and subsequent 
Lomé Convention of 1980, 1985 and 1990) facilitated free trade between 
the EC and the ACP group, protecting European investment in the ACP 
region as much as guaranteeing free access for ACP goods into the 
European common market. The ACP grouping established its secretariat in 
 
14 Georgetown Agreement on the Organization of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States, 1975, online at: www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/regeco_treaties/details. 
 jsp?group_id=24&treaty_id=200. 
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Brussels and a trade office in Geneva at the seat of GATT. Most ACP 
operations and programs were (and are) financed by the European 
Community through subsequent European Development Funds.  
The artificial ‘coalition of the poor’, as the ACP Group of States likes to be 
seen, engaged with the European Community in a series of treaties which 
provided privileged aid and trade relations – as much in the interest of post-
colonial elites across the developing world as in the interest of European 
investor and importing companies by enhancing the reliability of trade ties 
with former European colonies. The concept ‘not aid but trade’ was 
translated into a system of preferential import conditions from the ACP 
region into the European common market; stabilizing the market price of 
agricultural goods through STABEX (Stabilization of Export Earnings) and 
of mineral commodities through SYSMIN (System for Stabilization of 
Export Revenues in Minerals) which guaranteed stability of trading ties 
between European companies and their subsidiaries or partners across the 
ACP region. Over time, the counter-productive effects of these subsidy 
systems have become evident: Preferential EU-ACP trade relations 
prolonged post-colonial ties between raw or semi-raw material producers 
on the one hand and the benefits for value-chains located primarily in 
Europe on the other hand.15 The Lomé Conventions did not contribute to 
diversification, de-monopolization or industrial production across the ACP 
region. Between 1980 and 2000, the ACP share of exports from the EC/EU 
went down from 8.5 percent to merely 2.8 percent. At the same time, and in 
spite of unilateral trade preferences, the share of imports from the ACP 
group of countries to the EC/EU went down from 8.1 percent to 3.4 
percent. 16  Moreover, preferential trade conditions established under the 
Lomé Conventions antagonized other developing countries outside the ACP 
group. They demanded an end to these exclusive privileges which after all, 
the EC was only granting to a select number of developing countries. 
Honest stock-taking about the economic effects of EU-ACP trade relations 
 
15 See Susanna Wolf, Begrenzter Erfolg der Lomé-Abkommen. Eine empirische 
Untersuchung der Wirkungen der EU-Zollpräferenzen auf den Haushalt der AKP-
Staaten, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996. 
16 Philipp Gieg, Great Game um Afrika? Europa, China und die USA auf dem 
Schwarzen Kontinent, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010, p. 85. 
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includes an assessment of the dilemma of asymmetric trade relations, post-
colonial dependencies and the structural preservation of production-chains 
to the benefit of the EU. Overcoming the post-colonial donor-recipient-
equation remains an ongoing challenge for any possible perspective post-
2020. 
III. Remnants of the Cold War: governance-issues and 
growing skepticism toward the West 
A second set of issues has penetrated EC-ACP relations since the beginning 
and it intensified during the 1980s: the European demand to link economic 
development to good governance and human rights. After a decade of often 
ideological debates about a New World Economic Order, the Western 
world responded with a counter-strategy: ‘Political dialogue’ became a 
mantra for the growing demand in Europe (in parallel with similar policies 
of the World Bank and the IMF) not only for structural economic reforms, 
but also for political reforms in the developing world. This policy priority 
came as an indirect result of the Cold War and its Third World proxy wars. 
Progress in development was considered a function of good governance 
and human rights. While the incentives chosen to influence Third World 
partners were not often successful, sanctions were no more effective in 
easing Western frustration about the slow speed of governance reforms in 
developing countries. “Conditionality” became the key word of the third 
Lomé Convention (1985) and the fourth Lomé Convention (1990).17 With 
the end of the Cold War, the quest for political democratization and 
economic liberalization received an additional boost in the development 
agenda, with intensified neo-liberal structural adjustment policies executed 
 
17 See Matthew MacQueen, After Lomé IV: ACP-EU trade preferences in the 21st 
century, in: Intereconomics. Review of international trade and development, 
34/1999, No. 5: p. 223-232; Martin Holland, The European Union and the Third 
World, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002; Nikki Slocum-Bradley/Andrew Bradley, Is the 
EU’s Governance ‘Good’? An Assessment of EU Governance in Its Partnership 
with ACP States, in: Third World Quarterly, Vol 31/No. 1, 2010: p. 31-49, and 
UNU-CRIS-Working Paper W 2010/1, Bruges: UNU-CRIS, 2010, online at: 
www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/W-2010-1_-_new_version.pdf. 
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by the World Bank and IMF, which echoed the EU’s policy of 
conditionality. 
But conditionality and the search for effective incentives to promote good 
governance were not the only Cold War legacies. The end of the Cold War 
coincided with an increasing debate about globalization. 18  One of its 
features was the growing demand from non-ACP developing countries as 
well as other industrialized countries, including the United States, for the 
EU to abandon its preferential trade relations with the ACP Group of States 
in favor of a general and globalized free trade approach. This resulted in 
several GATT Panels where the EU was charged and whose rulings forced 
the EU to eventually re-consider its privileged subsidies and protective 
trade relations with ACP countries.19 Gradually, agricultural products (i.e. 
sugar, coffee, tea, bananas and cocoa) but also raw materials were 
considered to be protected in unacceptable ways against the interests of 
other players in the global economy. The issue of “blood diamonds”, 
especially in war-torn areas of Western and Central Africa, added to the 
moral de-legitimization of the privileged post-colonial relations of the EU-
ACP arrangement.  
Surprisingly enough, with the demise of the Soviet bloc – including the 
ramifications for Third World developments – a new wave of anti-Western 
sentiment emerged in the developing world. The EU was no longer the 
gentle normative power (as it loves to be perceived), providing the largest 
amount of development aid (which it does), but was considered a 
paternalistic bullying bloc with a tendency to become a trade fortress not 
ready to sufficiently open its markets for goods and products from 
developing countries. EU migration policies added to the list of 
frustrations, while the role of China was often exaggerated as a systemic 
 
18 In the African context see: Fantu Cheru, African Renaissance: Roadmaps to the 
Challenge of Globalization, London/New York: Zed Books, 2002. 
19 For a significant view see Peter Clegg, From Insiders to Outsiders: Caribbean 
Banana Interests in the New International Trading Framework, in: Stephen J. H. 
Dearden (ed.), The European Union and the Caribbean, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, 
p. 79-113. 
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alternative in terms of development model and geopolitical partnership.20 
Indeed, some of the EU’s moral high ground during the immediate post-
Cold War days was lost, with the growing presence of China across much 
of the developing world, offering a distinctly different set of trade relations 
without political conditions and lecturing on human rights and good 
governance. Yet, Chinese development aid came and comes with the 
danger of a new wave of indebtedness across ACP regions. But without a 
doubt, the new debate on development models and possible alternatives 
forced the traditional EU-ACP relationship onto the defensive.  
IV. Post-Cold War stalemate: Cotonou and Economic 
Partnership Agreements  
In 2000, the series of Lomé Conventions came to an end. The sequence of 
Lomé Conventions was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, designed to 
cover a period of altogether twenty years until 2020.21 Quite uncommon for 
such an international cooperative agreement, the Cotonou Agreement 
structured EU-ACP long-term relations in a legally binding nature across 
three baskets: aid, trade and political dialogue. The aid approach coincided 
with and reinforced the 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals, while 
the trade agenda introduced a certain deconstruction of the ACP grouping 
with the focus on regional economic developments and political trends, 
thus taking into consideration the growing role of regional economic 
communities within the different sub-regions of the ACP grouping. Article 
96 of the Cotonou Agreement became the notorious instrument for 
imposing sanctions against ACP countries who do not comply with EU 
 
20 For the larger context of African relations with its global partners see: Ludger 
Kühnhardt, Africa Consensus. New Interests, Initiatives, and Partners, Washington 
D.C./Baltimore, Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2014.  
21 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
group of states on the one hand, and the European Community and its Member 
States, on the other, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, in: Official Journal of the 
European Communities, L317/3, 15.12.2000, online at: www.acp.int/content/acp-
ec-partnership-agreement-cotonou-agreement-accord-de-partenariat-acp-ce-accord-
de-cotonou. 
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political norms; inter alia, in the case of Fiji after a military coup in 2006. 
Less known (and used in its full sense) is Article 8, which also enables the 
ACP countries to invoke a political dialogue if they wish to discuss any 
pending EU policy matter.22  
The Cotonou Agreement was revised in 2005 and again in 2010. The first 
revision – concluded in Luxembourg on June 25, 2005 and entering into 
force on July 1, 2008 – introduced new issues related to security and the 
fight against terrorism (post 9/11) to the EU-ACP agenda; it also supported 
the recognition of the International Court of Justice.23 The second revision 
of the Cotonou Agreement – signed on June 22, 2010 and entering 
provisionally into force on November 1, 2010 (still being subject to 
ratification in some countries which led to the cancellation of the plan for a 
third revision in 2015, which would have had to include South Sudan as a 
new country in the African ACP region) – included issues of climate 
change and food security, the problems of fragile states and matters related 
to an improved effectiveness of EU aid and trade policies. In the meantime, 
the ACP Group of States had grown to a membership of 79 states across 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.  
More debated than anything else in the context of the ACP-EU Partnership 
Agreement (the formal name of the Cotonou Agreement) since it was 
agreed to in 2000, was (and still is) the concept of Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). The Cotonou Agreement stipulated that the negotiation 
of regional free trade arrangements between the EU and several ACP 
regional subgroups was to be concluded by 2007. The debate surrounding 
these Economic Partnership Agreements consumed most of the first decade 
 
22 A rather self-critical assessment of the current instruments of political cooperation 
by the European Commission: European Commission. Directorate-General for 
External Policies, Political Dialogue on Human Rights under Article 8 of the 
Cotonou Agreement, Brussels: European Commission. Directorate-General for 
External Policies, 2014.  
23 European Commission, Partnership Agreement ACP-EU. Signed in Cotonou on 23 
June 2000. Revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005, Brussels: European 
Commission. Directorate-General for Development, 2006. 
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of the Cotonou Agreement. 24  While the EU insisted that bi-regional 
economic free trade arrangements were inevitable in order to bring the EU-
ACP relationship in line with the requirements of the WTO (reciprocity, 
non-discrimination of third parties, rules of origin)25, the officials of the 
ACP group felt almost betrayed by the pressure exercised on them by the 
EU. Solidarity among the “coalition of the poor” came under pressure too, 
as individual countries ended up negotiating free trade arrangements 
unilaterally with the EU instead of with their respective regional 
community. Further, the EU practiced cherry-picking by organizing 
regional groups of its own liking, not fully accepting the realities of 
regional integration as they have evolved across Africa, the Caribbean and 
 
24 See Sanoussi Bilal, et al., Alternative to EPAs. Possible scenarios for the future. 
ACP trade relations with the EU, Maastricht: European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, 2006, online at: www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/ 
Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/89C4101716533AD1C125799700402F12/$FILE/P
MR11_e.pdf.; Catherine Grant, Ongoing Trade Negotiations–EPA, Stellenbosch: 
Tralac, 2006, online at: epa.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=5103&print=1.; 
Christopher Stevens, The EU, Africa and economic partnership agreements: 
unintended consequences of policy leverage, in: Journal of Modern African Studies, 
No. 44, Cambridge, 2006: 441-458, online at: www.journals.cambridge.org/ 
 download.php?file=%2FMOA%2FMOA44_03%2FS0022278X06001844a.pdf&co
de=4aa15acd6b4c6fa55e74d9e8bd98cb77; Matthias Busse, et al., The institutional 
challenge of the ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreements, HWWA Research 
Paper 2-3, Hamburg: Hamburger Welt-Wirtschafts-Institut, 2006, online at: 
www.hwwi.org/hwwi/Publikationen/Research/Paper/Handel_und_Entwicklung 
/HWWI_Research_Paper_2-3.pdf. Emily Jones/Marti Darlan, Updating Economic 
Partnerships Agreements to Today’s Global Challenges, Economic Policy Paper 
Series 09, Washington: The German Marshall Fund, 2009, online at: 
cis.politics.ox.ac.uk/research/Projects/Global_Trade_Ethics/Economic_Policy_ 
 Series_09.pdf; Linda Engel, EPAs als Entwicklungsinstrumente? Ideen und 
Diskurse in den Verhandlungen der Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen 
der EU und den AKP-Staaten. Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2012. 
25 Axel Borrmann et al., The WTO Compatibility of the Economic Partnership 
Agreement between the EU and the ACP states, Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2005; Eckart Naumann, Comparing EU free trade 
agreements – Rules of origin, in: ECDPM InBrief 61, Maastricht: European Centre 
for Development Policy Management, 2006, online at: 
www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nst.vw.; Anne Genin, Von 
Lomé zu den Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen. Die Zukunft der 
gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Präferenzsysteme zugunsten der Entwicklungsländer im 
Rahmen der WTO am Beispiel der AKP-EG-Handelszusammenarbeit, Stuttgart: 
Boorberg, 2010.  
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the Pacific islands regions. By the 2007 deadline, only one EPA had been 
signed, between the EU and CARIFORUM, an artificial arrangement of 
most CARICOM countries plus the Dominican Republic and Cuba.26 To 
the surprise of many, 2013 ended with the conclusion of negotiations on a 
second comprehensive EPA between the EU and ECOWAS.27 Eventually, 
the EU extended the deadline for EPA negotiations to 2016, when the 
privilege of duty-free export to the EU for “everything but arms” was to 
expire. As of 2016, the overall ‘state of play’ of EPA negotiations was not 
impressive at all:  
 
West Africa: West-Africa-European Union negotiations of an Economic 
Partnership Agreement were closed by Chief Negotiators on 6 February 
2014 in Brussels. The text was initialed on 30 June and on 10 July 2014, 
ECOWAS Heads of State endorsed the EPA for signature. The signature 
process is currently ongoing. 
Central Africa: Cameroon signed the interim EPA for Central Africa as the 
only country in the region on 15 January 2009. The European Parliament 
gave its consent in June 2013. In July 2014 the Parliament of Cameroon 
approved the ratification of the Agreement and on 4 August 2014 the 
agreement entered into provisional application. European and Central 
African negotiators have discussed at technical level on market access, 
services, cultural cooperation and accompanying measures. Progress has 
also been made on the text of the agreement. The negotiations are currently 
delayed because of the situation in the Central African Republic. The 
mandate of the Central African negotiators has been updated at the end of 
March 2014 and negotiations are still expected to resume on this basis. 
  
 
26 For an assessment see Erika Günther, Regionale Integration und die Economic 
Partnership Agreements der EU. Das EPA mit der Karibik am Fallbeispiel 
CARICOM, Saarbrücken: VDM, 2011. 
27 “EU seals free trade deal with West Africa”, Euractiv, February 7, 2014, online at: 
www.euractiv.com/development-policy/eu-seals-free-trade-deal-west-af-news-
533293. 
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Eastern and Southern Africa: In 2009 Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe 
and Madagascar signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (iEPA). The 
Agreement is provisionally applied since 14 May 2012. The European 
Parliament gave its consent on 17 January 2013. The inaugural iEPA 
Committee was held in October 2012 in Brussels, and the latest, fourth, 
meeting took place in November 2014 in Zimbabwe. The Customs 
Cooperation Committee and the Joint Development Committee were also 
held alongside the iEPA Committee. 
Eastern African Community: In June 2010, a Ministerial meeting held in 
Dar Es Salaam noted that EAC was not ready to sign the Framework EPA 
initialed in November 2007 and both sides agreed to seek a successor 
agreement to their framework (interim) agreement. The ministerial EPA 
meeting held in January 2014 was a key step towards conclusion of the 
negotiations and in three rounds Senior Officials resolved the few 
outstanding issues to bring the deal to conclusion on 16 October 2014. On 
11 September 2015, both parties completed the legal scrubbing of the 
initialed EPA text. 
South African Development Community: On 15 July 2014 the EPA 
negotiations were successfully concluded in South Africa. This ended ten 
years of negotiations and produced an Agreement that will replace the 
interim EPA signed by the EU and by Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Swaziland in June 2009. That agreement was never ratified. 
Caribbean: The CARIFORUM – EU EPA was signed in October 2008 and 
approved by the EP in March 2009. The agreement: opens up trade in 
services as well as in goods; seeks to spur more investment in the 
Caribbean; commits governments to other trade-promoting measures, like 
ensuring free and fair competition; promotes development that respects the 
environment and people’s rights at work. The EPA also sets up several 
joint institutions, that have met regularly since 2010: The Trade and 
Development Committee (senior officials) held its fifth meeting in 
Georgetown, Guyana in July 2015: the Joint CARIFORUM-EU Council 
(ministers), that held its third meeting also in Georgetown in July 2015. 
These joint institutions review progress and issues so far in applying the 
EPA, and agree on next steps. The Consultative Committee representing 
civil society held its first meeting in Brussels on 13-14 November 2014.  
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Pacific: Signed by the EU and Papua New Guinea (PNG) on 30 July and 
by Fiji on 11 December 2009. EP ratified on 19 January 2011. EU 
ratification completed by Council on 15 February 2011. The third meeting 
of the Trade Committee established under the EPA took place in Brussels 
in July 2013. The Parliament of Papua New Guinea ratified the EPA on 25 
May 2011. On 17 July 2014 Fiji decided to start provisionally applying the 
agreement. In negotiations on a comprehensive regional Economic 
Partnership Agreement, four technical rounds have taken place since 
October 2012, the latest one in Brussels from 24 June to 5 July 2013 on 
fisheries, trade in goods, development cooperation, sustainable 
development, and rules of origin. Moreover, an informal ministerial 
meeting with EU and Pacific region representatives to take stock of the 
current was held in the Solomon Islands on 12 December 2013. However, 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji did not attend this meeting. 
In conclusion: Economic Partnership Agreements as a new core concept of 
EU-ACP relations and the EU’s way of negotiating EPAs have been a 
failure. 28  Patrick I. Gomes, ACP Secretary General since 2015 (and 
formerly a highly respected Ambassador of Guyana to the European 
Union), summarized the ACP’s stand in a nutshell: “Throughout the 
negotiations, the EU side failed to articulate an understanding of trade as an 
instrument of development. This was of course the overriding concern of 
ACP states and is alleged to be a reason why some turn to countries such as 
China for the requisite action where large infrastructure projects are 
needed.”29 The EPA legacy has left both sides traumatized. 
While the EU felt disappointed that many of its traditional ACP partners 
did not accept the approach the EU had asked them to take without too 
 
28 See Patrick Reich, EU-AKP Partnerschaftsabkommen – eine Bilanz. Das 
Abkommen von Cotonou zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Hamburg: 
Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 2011; Luc De Benedictis/Luca Salvatici,(eds.), 
The Trade Impact of European Preferential Policies, Berlin: Springer, 2011; Oliver 
Morrissey, (eds.), Assessing Prospective Trade Policy: Methods Applied to EU-
ACP Economic Partnership Agreements, London: Routledge, 2011. 
29 Patrick I. Gomes, Reshaping an Asymmetrical Partnership: ACP-EU Relations 
from an ACP Perspective, in: Journal of International Development, Volume 25, 
Issue 5/2013, p. 721. 
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much arguing, most ACP countries became aware that EU interests and 
their own interests might clash more often than in the past. The idea of 
establishing unprotected free trade relations as the single most important 
step to an inclusive world economy between the powerful single market of 
505 million consumers in 28 industrialized countries and several sub-
regions of countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, many of 
whom remain without any solid base of industrial production, remains a 
matter of intensive controversy; especially in the view of NGOs both in the 
EU and in ACP countries. 41 of the 79 ACP countries still figure as Least 
Developed Countries (LDC), 11 of them have reached the status of Lower 
Middle Income Countries, 23 of them the status of Upper Middle Income 
Countries and 4 of them the status of High Income Countries. For those 
Least Developed Countries among ACP states who did not sign an EPA in 
time, the preferential duty-free trade access to the EU market under the 
‘everything but arms’ initiative remained a safe haven which did not force 
them to compromise beyond their preferences in negotiating with the EU. 
The result was some sort of a race to the bottom. It could not remedy the 
strong increase in mistrust and frustration both in the EU and among many 
ACP countries.  
The 2010 mid-term evaluation of the EU-ACP relationship did not result in 
any convincing innovation. 30  In spite of the all-pervasive partnership 
rhetoric, the donor-recipient-relationship has not substantially changed. 
Most of the ACP is still dependent upon financial support from the EU – 
this holds true for the ACP headquarters and its infrastructure as much as 
for significant percentages of most ACP member state budgets. While 
growing regionalization in the ACP regions has contributed to the growing 
rise of region-building across the world, the EU obviously does not take the 
existing regional groupings as seriously as it pretends to. On the whole the 
ACP Group of States finds it difficult to convincingly demonstrate its 
readiness and capability of being a political partner for the EU in 
 
30 Sven Grimm/Davina Makhan, Überarbeitung des Cotonou-Abkommens – nichts 
Neues unter der Sonne?, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2010, 
online at: www.die-gdi.de/CMSHomepage/openwebcms3.nsf/ 
 (ynDK_contentByKey)/MRUR-8739PT.   
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international fora. Moreover, the economic effect of the ACP Group of 
States on EU import and export figures remains suboptimal, some critics 
say: marginal. 
V. New realities and key actors: parameters until 2019 
Since the Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000, the EU and the ACP 
countries have undergone manifold transformations. The EU has been 
enlarged in 2004, 2007 and 2013 to include eleven post-communist 
countries plus two former British colonies (Malta and Cyprus). None of 
whom entertain relations with ACP states comparable with those of the 
former West European colonial powers and Northern European 
development aid empires. For post-communist countries, the priority of 
catching up with the value chain of Western Europe and enhancing the 
competitiveness of their industrial potential in the global economy has been 
more of a priority than any reflection on the future of the South. The Lisbon 
Treaty (signed in 2007, in force since December 2009) does not mention 
the ACP Group of States as a special concern of the EU. It outlines foreign 
policy principles – and development policy objectives – but does not make 
any specific reference to the ACP Group of States.  
The EU external trade agenda is dominated by ties to the US, to emerging 
markets – China in particular – and to other larger populations in the world 
with a relevant effect on EU trade patterns. The ACP Group of States 
clearly falls behind in terms of economic significance and hence is often 
neglected. The emotional ties of decades gone by do not play a significant 
role any more in the corridors of decision-making and policy-
implementation in Brussels or in most EU member states – with the 
possible exception of special interests still represented and emotionally 
linked to policy circles in Paris and London. The ACP Group of States has 
observed the past twenty years of EU internal development with mixed 
feelings. On the one hand, the EU has been immersed in the post-
communist transformation rhetoric of market-driven democratic change 
which also resonated in its development policy. On the other hand, the EU 
has redirected funds in support of its Eastern neighbors and its new 
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member states – to the detriment of its commitments to the ACP regions, or 
so they believe. Almost nostalgic sentiments to preserve preferential ties 
with France and the UK, as well as with Belgium, and for certain countries 
with The Netherlands, Italy and Germany (sometimes even, one must 
admit, romanticizing the brief German period of colonial rule before World 
War I) can be found across the ACP Group of States, especially among 
some of its political and diplomatic actors and intellectuals. These 
sentiments reflect uneasiness among ACP countries about the growing 
“Europeanization of EU policies”, which – so it seems to them – no longer 
considers preferential bilateral post-colonial ties an essential part of the EU 
identity. Others across the ACP Group of States worry about further 
“mega-blocs” emerging as a consequence of bi-regional trade negotiations, 
i.e. between the EU and the US under the umbrella of a Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). They feel to be left-out, again, 
in the preparation of the next stage of industrial development (Industry 4.0) 
among leading industrialized countries. Echoing frustration about missed 
opportunities to industrialize in the global South in past decades.  
The ACP Group of States neighbors the biggest emerging markets, 
especially the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). But ACP 
relations with the BRICS and other emerging countries are a mixed bag.31 
On the one hand, investment from China, India, Brazil, South Africa, 
Russia and elsewhere is welcome across ACP regions, especially in the 
absence of EU investment in future oriented infrastructure. On the other 
hand, the ACP group’s internal solidarity is not reinforced by the 
emergence of BRICS at all, but it is rather torn apart by it: South Africa is 
both an ACP and a BRICS state, without having any visible effect on the 
stature of the ACP in the world; its trade volume – accounting for a third of 
 
31 See: European Centre for Development Policy Management (ed.), Global Changes, 
Emerging Players and Evolving EU-ACP Relations: Towards a common agenda for 
action? Maastricht: ECDPM 2011, online at: www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/ 
 Content/Download.nsf/0/DE1C420CB6DEEC0B2C12579260037AA45/$FILE/PM
R19-uk.pdf.; with a focus on the Caribbean: Annita Montoute, Emerging players in 
the Caribbean: What implications for the Caribbean, their relations with the EU and 
the ACP?, ECDPM Discussion Paper, No. 116, Brussels: European Centre or 
Development Management, 2011.  
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all European Union trade with the 79 ACP countries 32  – adds to the 
distortive asymmetries across the ACP regions. Some ACP countries have 
rushed to form new relationships with China. Others in turn are worried 
that too much Chinese influence and too much bilateralism with any 
emerging market may lead to a loss of autonomous decision making if the 
ACP Group of States is not going to stay together. Some ACP countries, 
after all, still maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, especially in the Pacific 
where the growing influence of mainland China is closest. Finally, new 
centers of gravity have emerged in each of the ACP regions – from the 
African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) with its common market, to the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) and, most recently, to the Small Island Development States 
(SIDS) group of 36 ACP states which organized their third (and so far most 
visible) summit meeting in Samoa in 2014.33 
A new agreement between the European Union and the ACP Group of 
States will be shaped by the leadership currently in place on both sides. The 
European Union leadership as it emerged in 2014 will be in office until 
2019 and hence will define the post – Cotonou process a great deal. It 
consists of a European Commission, committed to concluding a new 
agreement combining continuity with the Cotonou Agreement and cautious 
innovation along the lines of its claim to be first and foremost a political 
Commission: a European Parliament, more self-confident than ever, but 
under the pressure of Euro-sceptics – who tend to be protectionist,  often 
look critically at migration from the ACP region and also at development 
aid in general – and led by a grand coalition of mainstream parties who 
 
32 Elisabeth Pape, An old Partnership in a New Setting: ACP-EU Relations from a 
European Perspective, op.cit., p. 734. 
33 Recognizing the pioneer role of Malta in promoting the oceans as common heritage 
of mankind (Speech of Arvid Pardo before the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in November 1967), the former Secretary General of the Pacific Islands 
forum, Tuiloma Neroni Slade, has outlined the specific role of small island states in 
promoting international law: Tuiloma Neroni Slade, The Making of International 
Law: The Role of Small Island States, Lecture at Temple University, April 1, 2003, 
online at: www. litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=Document 
 Display&crawlid=1&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&doctype=cite&docid=17+Temp.+I
nt'l+%26+Comp.+L.J.+531&key=4c18932b763c7b498a53761e369be0ab. 
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pursue traditional EU normative discourses – such as promotion of human 
rights, conditionality in development, or reciprocal trade advantages; and a 
European Council representing all 28 EU member states who have 
overcome a daunting period of soul-searching, yet are still heavily under 
pressure to mobilize jobs and growth for their own citizens instead of 
engaging too enthusiastically with the concerns and interests of distant 
places which, some fear, may even bring more instability to their doorsteps. 
This constellation may have two consequences for further EU deliberations 
with the ACP Group of States: Either the EU will remain restrained and 
thus tight to the well-known and established stakeholder community in 
development matters or it will have the courage to enlarge its circle of 
stakeholders substantially by also engaging with traditional foreign policy 
discourses, investment and innovation policies, the private sector and civil 
society. Neither of the two projections provides reassuring insights into the 
possible outcomes of the European reflection on the dialogue with the ACP 
Group of States. 
The ACP Group of States needs to broaden its visibility across the three 
continents it claims to represent, all of which are engaged in their own 
complex agendas. It is weak in its negotiation powers and even weaker in 
its ability to project ACP positions toward a broader European public. If 
analyzed honestly, this starting point is not very promising. While the 
European Union is – in spite of all its weaknesses – a strong institutional 
arrangement, the ACP Group of States is not. Disagreement and criticism is 
widely spread, to the extent that the rhetoric of solidarity among ACP 
countries does not stand the test of time when individual national interests, 
somewhere across the vast ACP region, are touched upon. Size and 
numbers alone do not matter if it comes to pragmatic interests and the way 
they are organized. Harmonizing ACP interests and communicating them 
properly with EU representatives is essential for any ACP leverage over the 
next few years. In December 2014, the ACP Ministerial meeting held in 
Brussels elected Patrick Ignatius Gomes as the new ACP Secretary 
General, who will serve from March 2015 until February 2020. The long-
standing Ambassador of Guyana to the European Union and member of the 
ACP Eminent Persons Group, Gomes authored a report of the group of 
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ACP Ambassadors to the EU on the prospects for restructuring the ACP 
Secretariat in Brussels. Gomes is an impressive personality as the 
coordinator of a huge variety of ACP actors and spokesperson of the 
common cause of the global South. However, his bargaining power is 
limited by the constraints of his office and the structure he operates in: 
With almost no exception, only Caribbean news media noted the election 
of Ambassador Gomes as ACP Secretary General (against two other 
Caribbean candidates). This media response across the global South was an 
indication of the deficit of a comprehensive perception of the meaning of 
the ACP Group of States across all three regions. But also this observation 
has to be added: With the election of Patrick Ignatius Gomes, the rotating 
system of the ACP has brought the Caribbean into the driver’s seat ahead 
of formalized EU-ACP negotiations toward a post-Cotonou Agreement. 
Given the insider knowledge of Gomes and the smart way of Caribbean 
interactions with European affairs, the other ACP regions seem well 
represented by him. With his personal background and insider knowledge, 
a genuine Caribbean perspective and tone may not be to the disadvantage 
of the other ACP regions.  
The European Union and all those involved in preparing and pursuing the 
forthcoming negotiations with the ACP Group of States should recognize a 
strong and coherent presence of the ACP under the coordinating leadership 
of Secretary General Gomes in line with their own interest: The EU will be 
better served in its global role if it reaches a good and lasting post-Cotonou 
Agreement with all ACP Group of State countries.  
This remark points to the obvious: For the European Union, Africa is of 
greatest importance among the three ACP regions. The EU will have to 
connect its well-developed strategic partnership with the African Union, in 
existence since 2007, with the overall ACP perspective. It will also have to 
accommodate special features of the Northern African dimension, usually 
covered by the EU’s Neighborhood Policy, yet an integral aspect of the 
Africa-EU Partnership. The Ocean economies in the Pacific resonate in the 
EU only when issues related to climate change are addressed. But distance 
and size minimize the moral high ground which is invoked when the 
survival of Pacific islands is mentioned. The EU needs to enhance its 
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engagement with the Pacific islands states also in reaction to the increasing 
geopolitical and geo-economic interest of other players in the region, 
including Australia and New Zealand, China, India and the US. The 
Caribbean, finally, is no longer the geopolitical issue it was during the Cold 
War, when Cuba was highlighting the East-West divide. With the 
normalization of relations between the US and Cuba, the EU will be 
confronted with new competition over Caribbean markets, thus indirectly 
linking the post-2020 negotiations with the perspective of a Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), negotiated between the EU and 
the US. But for the EU, the Caribbean market or the resources in the Gulf 
of Mexico are not in any way comparable to the trade relevance of EU-US 
relations and of EU-Mercosur relations. On top of this, the possible global 
diplomatic capital for the EU that could be seen in the continuous existence 
of the ACP Group of States is minimized by rather sober experiences in 
past decades regarding the global support of EU positions – including the 
notorious reservation of CARICOM member states in 2010 to accept an 
enhanced observer status of the EU at the UN General Assembly (which 
was eventually accepted in May 2011 after some arm twisting and 
compromises, reducing the EU’s claim for exceptionalism in its UN 
representation). Against this backdrop, the Caribbean leadership in the 
ACP Secretariat during the period of negotiations for a post-Cotonou 
Agreement may turn out to be a double-edged sword for some in the EU.  
The possible merger of the European Development Fund with the general 
EU budget – due not before 2021 – is a continuing matter of concern 
among ACP representatives: They fear that although oversight rights of the 
European Parliament will enhance the African priority, the European 
Parliament will also demand more deliverables from the ACP Group in 
return for fresh EU money. Moreover, the problem of duplicating tasks 
which other national, regional or even global institutions can cope with in 
an effective way, looms large over the ACP Group of States. The 
negotiation position of the ACP Group of States on a future agreement with 
the EU is clear: it is the ACP’s objective to preserve and to renew the EU-
ACP relationship while its political content shall be deepened. At the same 
time, the ACP Group of States wants to broaden its scope of partnerships 
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beyond the EU; primarily, the ACP group of countries is interested in 
strengthening ties with the BRICS group of states as additional anchors 
helping the ACP countries to enhance their global presence and economic 
weight. As for the EU, the early reflections on a post-Cotonou Agreement 
were rather critical, questioning the economic benefit of the EU-ACP 
relationship; demanding more concrete actions and results on the side of 
the ACP; preferring regional approaches which seem to better reflect the 
diverse realities in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. A serious cost-
benefit analysis of EU-ACP relations covering all possible aspects is yet to 
be done.34 
Becoming recognized as a pole of global stability requires the ACP to 
practically reinvent itself – and this time neither as an appendix to the EU 
nor as the EU’s nemesis. This might partly come about as a consequence of 
the result of future negotiations with the EU for a post-Cotonou Agreement. 
But it will take the ACP Group of States more than that to project its 
ambition for a continuing and growing global role. As for the EU, initial 
scholarly reflections on a post-Cotonou Agreement demand a clearer focus 
on principles and a better rationale for the very foundation and impact of a 
continued EU-ACP relationship.  
The following chapters of this paper intend to outline a strategic road map 
ahead which can accommodate the interests of the European Union and 
 
34 See eg. Miriam Van Reisen, The Old Man and the Seas: The Future of the EU-ACP 
Relationship, The Broker, No.25/Special Report, Leiden: 2011, online at: 
www.thebrokeronline.eu/var/broker/storage/original/application/f711797d7b545f8f
bcab413889c4e336.pdf.; Miriam Van Reisen, The future of the ACP-EU 
relationship, European Ideas, 29.05.2012, online at: www.europeanideas.eu/pages/ 
 Economics/international-trade/the-future-of-the-acp-eu-relationship.php.;Geert 
Laporte, What future for the ACP and the Cotonou Agreement? Preparing for the 
next steps in the debate, Briefing Note, No. 34, April 2012, Brussels: European 
Centre for Development Policy Management online at: 
www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/A80840C540D36B
E8C12579D000311896/$FILE/BN34-What%20future%20for%20the%20ACP- 
 FINAL.pdf.; Niels Keijzer et al., ACP-EU relations beyond 2020: Exploring 
European perceptions, Briefing Paper 11, Bonn: German Development 
Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2013, online at: www.die-
gdi.de/CMS-homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey) /ANES-975D3F 
 ?Open. 
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include sufficient overlap with the interests of the ACP Group of States. It 
is a forward-strategy which offers reflection beyond the usual parameters 
and limits of the EU-ACP agenda. 
VI. The future (I): a stronger rationale and a wider thematic 
scope 
The future arrangement between the European Union and the ACP Group 
of States needs to be comprehensive and strategic, convincing to all and 
forward-looking. The main advantages of past experiences have to be 
outlined and the value-added for the future must be formulated in clear 
terms. Five points are essential for preserving, maturing and upgrading the 
EU-ACP relationship in the years ahead: 
1. The value of a contractual and legally binding EU-ACP relationship. 
The post-Cotonou Agreement must first and foremost advocate its global 
value. No political strategy, communique or diplomatic document can bring 
about what the current Cotonou Agreement is at its core: It is a legally 
binding contractual framework reinforcing political principles and norms of 
international law in a unique context. While international law so often is 
under pressure these days, the value-added of a legally binding, contractual 
EU-ACP relationship cannot be emphasized enough. Reciprocal 
commitments and predictability for all parties involved is unparalleled and 
should not be compromised for the sake of other, seemingly easier, options. 
The experience of the current acquis of EU-ACP relations must be 
identified and properly named (especially the value of legally binding rules, 
common institutions, guaranteed allocation of financial resources, and the 
mechanism of consultation concerning any emerging legislation which may 
affect each other’s interests 35 ). A continuously contractual and legally 
 
35 These points are strongly supported by Dieter Frisch, The Future of ACP-EU 
Relations Beyond 2020. An update of my personal reflections, ECDPM Discussion 
Paper No. 172, Brussels: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 
2015, p. 2; see also the impressive and informative historic narrative by the same 
author: Dieter Frisch, The European Union’s development policy, ECDPM Policy 
Management Report 15, Brussels: European Centre for Development Policy 
Management, 2008.  
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binding arrangement can serve as a model contribution to global 
governance. The untapped potential from the unique nature of this 
contractual arrangement between four regions of the world may over time 
also resonate in the evolution of international law.  
2. The justification of a comprehensive EU-ACP agreement. The post-
Cotonou Agreement must be more explicit about the mutual interests it 
serves. This can happen only if a comprehensive agenda of shared norms 
accommodates those aspects of the relationship which are predefined by 
the obvious asymmetries between the EU and its ACP partners, as well as 
among ACP countries and regions. The only way to move away from a 
hierarchic donor-recipient-relationship is recognition of the equality of 
people living in all four EU-ACP regions and their shared desire to 
contribute to a better, more human world. Hence, the post-Cotonou 
Agreement must go beyond the traditional focus on development. Only by 
better connecting its purpose and objectives to the broader domestic agenda 
in each of the regions, can the EU-ACP post-Cotonou relationship reach 
out to constituencies beyond the traditional stakeholders in development 
policy. A comprehensive strategic association must be accompanied by a 
convincing and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of all economic and 
non-economic aspects of the future EU-ACP relationship. 
3. The objectives of a strong EU-ACP relationship. The post-Cotonou 
Agreement must be more explicit about its objectives than the current 
Cotonou Agreement. This can only be done by way of formulating the 
specific added value of its approach (legally binding, integral approach to 
development, trade, political norms; prioritizing values and good 
governance) and comparing it with the limits of other existing international 
frameworks or networks, including the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals. It is essential to better define incentives which help to make any set 
of intentional politics work. 
4. The contradictions and ‘parochialisms’ of an exclusive EU-ACP 
agreement. The post-Cotonou Agreement must address upfront how it sees 
the grouping’s role vis-à-vis other international arrangements and fora, 
primarily the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the bi-
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lateral and bi-regional relations of any other EU and ACP partners. The 
future EU-ACP Agreement must recognize possible contradictions between 
topics covered or affected by the agreement and other international 
obligations of EU-ACP partners. Finally, the future agreement must 
recognize the possibility of newly emerging interests within the EU-ACP 
grouping and of other international actors partnering with EU and ACP 
countries  in a third context. The future agreement must simply state that all 
partners involved in the EU-ACP relationship have a legitimate interest in 
diversifying and multiplying the scope of their cooperation around the 
globe. In reality, this means that the ACP Group of Countries must accept 
the primordial importance of EU relations with the United States, while the 
European Union must become much more pro-active in including China – a 
preferential partner for many ACP countries – into tripartite forms of 
cooperation. On the other hand, a post-Cotonou Agreement would not 
serve any purpose if it would broaden its scope so much to include further 
regions or countries of the world (i.e. Latin America, North Africa).  
5. The branding of a forward-looking future EU-ACP agreement. The EU 
and the ACP Group of States must admit that the past branding of their 
relationship did not reach beyond the development and trade community. 
Neither the acronyms related to the cities in which the consecutive treaties 
were signed (Yaoundé Convention, Lomé Conventions, Cotonou 
Agreement) or the very term ‘EU-ACP’ have become globally recognizable 
brand names. Moving beyond the misnamed Economic Partnership 
Agreement, the EU and the ACP Group of States should be ambitious 
enough to label their next arrangement EU-ACP Association Treaty for 
Development. For a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development to 
come about, the EU and the ACP Group of States must be willing to move 
from the promise of rhetoric partnership to the potential of serious 
association. Not the name of a city but rather a clearly distinguishable 
content can help in branding this ambition. And the EU should not stand 
first, but its partners across the global South, so often humiliated in history.  
The original themes of the Cotonou Agreement will most likely surface 
again in a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development. It is hard to 
imagine that an existing and reasonably solid thematic structure will be 
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completely unraveled when so many actors and their interests have to be 
accommodated. It is all the more necessary to lobby for a better focus and a 
wider scope within the existing thematic parameters. This ought to entail: 
1. Development: The original motivation of an association agreement 
between European countries (both former colonial powers and non-colonial 
countries) and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries was aid-driven, 
based on transforming notions of development. However, the path from aid 
to trade and from poverty alleviation to sustainable development has 
remained strongly influenced by rather abstract notions of policy-induced 
and socially engineered concepts of development.36 With the evolution of 
the UN Human Development Index, the human-centeredness of 
development has been rehabilitated, at least partially. Given the normative 
ambition of the EU-ACP grouping, one should expect a genuine and 
pronounced commitment to ‘human dignity’ as being central to any future 
association and development strategy. As a consequence, human 
development must primarily focus on the different life phases of 
individuals and the related human needs to advance dignity, life chances 
and happiness. This implies priority for health and education issues, for 
jobs and economic independence, for social welfare (at least in a minimal 
sense) and a dignified life for the elderly. Translated into the space and 
language of politics, human-centered development must be understood as a 
universal strategy in support of human self-realization. Development 
strategies, by consequence, can never do more than provide an enabling 
frame. Subsidiarity, a concept originating in Catholic social doctrine, 
means exactly this: supporting people to strengthen themselves. The term 
‘ownership’, widely popularized by the United Nations, covers the same 
idea. Hence, facilitating ownership is the meaning and purpose of social 
capital, public infrastructure, legal protection of property and private 
investment; of good governance, rule of law and capacity building in the 
service of a better functioning of state and society. Ownership serves 
human fulfillment and is not a purpose in itself. 
 
36 See: Gilbert Rist, The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global 
Faith, London: Zed Books, 2008 (3. edition). 
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In financial and conceptual terms, development aid as the global tool to 
realize development cooperation is equivalent to global social aid – a 
welfare and redistribution scheme among regions and societies around the 
world. It will never be more than this. In recognition of all of the legitimate 
criticism of development aid, development financing should be preserved 
as an expression of global social aid. Development aid, understood 
correctly, translates the idea of human solidarity to the global level, 
primarily with the objective to strengthen individual ownership and let 
societies ‘develop’ according to their own objectives and concepts. Across 
the ACP regions, frustration runs high among policy actors and officials 
about the bureaucratic procedures of the EU. Without denying gratitude for 
the EU support, the question is raised whether the EU is interested in 
procedures alone or also in results being implemented. Some partners feel 
humiliated by arrogant EU behavior, not so much on a personal level but 
through the procedures EU partners are made to feel mistrust and, at times, 
even inferiority. The EU needs to better respect the dignity, ability and 
honesty of its ACP partners on all levels, including in the management of 
development projects and their often cumbersome administrative 
procedures. 
Development aid, in the first place, should be interpreted by a future EU-
ACP Association Treaty for Development as global social welfare in the 
service of the poorest and most marginalized groups in the world. Thus, 
development aid can gain new recognition through a combination of its 
human-centeredness with a clear priority for the poor and needy based on 
the shared responsibility of donor and recipient countries. The sanctions 
regime which has evolved around the concept of conditionality has not 
really been convincing in advancing the objectives it is meant to promote.37 
A future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development must define a new 
balance of incentives and sanctions. The operational management of 
development-related projects should be left under the responsibility of 
individual ACP partner countries and kept outside the ACP structures.  
 
37 See Clara Portela, Aid Suspensions as Coercive Tools? The European Union’s 
Experience in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Context, in: Review of 
European and Russian Affairs, Vol. 3 (2007), pp. 38-53. 
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An updated concept of development must not only legitimize the transfer of 
development funds. It must also expand the very development matrix: 
preconditions for effective ownership, including policy structures and 
processes, have to be addressed. Criteria for resilient statehood and societal 
development must be included into the reasoning of a future EU-ACP 
Association Treaty for Development regarding the transfer of development 
aid resources. This is especially pertinent for matters of rule of law and of 
regulatory governance. Only enforceable mechanisms of regulatory 
governance can break those monopolies which prevent development 
progress from taking place. Monitoring resilience is as relevant for fragile 
states as it is for emerging states or states considered to be strong and 
stable. Early warning mechanisms more sensitive to the weakened 
resilience of any society and state could be a tool in support of the global 
recognition that all states and societies are developing – and not only those 
traditionally labelled (and often stigmatized) as developing countries. 
Matters of human security as well as those related to the classical 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force must be an integral part of any 
reasonable development concept for this century. It is here that a future 
EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development can truly add value through 
innovative approaches and criteria. The notion of development as a 
universal challenge makes all countries around the globe ‘developing’ 
countries. Such a universal and inclusive understanding ought to be 
promoted by the future EU-ACP relationship under the umbrella of an EU-
ACP Association Treaty for Development. 
The development concept for the 21st and 22nd century must include a 
strong maritime dimension. So far, sea routes and the need to protect them 
has played the central role, highly understandable as sixty per cent of all 
world trade uses ships for connecting production sites with respective 
markets. But sea lanes and security matters, including anti-piracy 
operations such as the one initiated by the European Union around the 
Horn of Africa (Atalanta) are only one aspect of a world rediscovering its 
maritime dimension. The new focus on international transport routes – such 
as the extension of the Suez Canal in 2015, the extension of the Panama 
Canal and the construction of the Nicaragua Canal (due in 2016), or the 
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Northeast Passage around the ice-free Arctic Circle (substantially reducing 
trading costs between Europe and East Asia, used for the first time by two 
German commercial ships in 2009 and by a Danish cargo ship in the 
reverse direction in 2013) – demonstrate the growing need for functioning 
maritime activities.  
There are fundamental maritime aspects which affect some of the weakest 
ACP countries, the small island states. Climate change may threaten the 
very survival of atoll states (Maldives, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Marshall 
Islands). But, paradoxically, climate change also increases ice and natural 
water in Antarctica. Could these resources be activated for the irrigation of 
dry areas in the world, including on the atoll countries who, for the time 
being, are struggling more with socio-economic challenges – including 
water shortage – than with the abstract fear of getting under water one day? 
Over time, the maritime dimension in all its aspects ought to be included 
into a comprehensive development matrix.  
The Exclusive Economic Zones around the Pacific island states turn some 
of the smallest island states into big players when one thinks not only of 
current fishing activities but also the prospects for deep sea mining, from 
phosphates off the coasts of Oceania to manganese in the Indian Ocean. 
Kiribati, for example, owns the second biggest Exclusive Economic Zone of 
any country on earth. Yet, today the bargaining power of Kiribati is too 
weak to make better use of its resources vis-à-vis European and other 
fishing interests: the EU must better respect Kiribati interests in promoting 
the entry of Kiribati processed-tuna into the EU. France maintains 
sovereignty over a great number of uninhabited islands in the Southern 
Indian Ocean which may one day serve as the spring board for deep sea 
extraction of energy resources. The maritime dimension is surfacing at the 
intersection of ecological and economic issues with new strategic security 
constellations – from the Chinese expansion into the South China Sea to 
Brazilian, Indian or South African power projections through blue water 
marine activities in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Will the new 
geopolitical race for the Arctic Circle repeat itself one day in even stronger 
dimensions over the untapped resources of Antarctica, the world’s third 
largest continent? The maritime dimension must be translated into a fresh 
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and broader understanding of maritime matters as part of the definition of 
human security. The future EU-ACP association could incorporate the 
complexity of maritime issues through a new institutional arrangement, an 
ACP-EU Maritime Forum. 
2. Trade: The future EU-ACP trade agenda must honestly look at deficits 
and stereotypes which have hampered relations in the past. Three aspects 
are particularly salient. 
First, EU-ACP relations cannot effectively advance the notion of global 
free trade if this concept is not coupled with the requirements of human 
development and social responsibility. The European model – so much 
lauded by EU leaders – combines market economy and social 
responsibility. No trade agenda encompassing the EU and the ACP Group 
of States should aim below this conceptual starting point: Free trade 
without recognizing its service for human and social development will not 
gain the legitimacy it requires both in the EU and across the ACP Group of 
States. Private market actors will always be the drivers of free trade. But 
policy frameworks and regulatory mechanisms must ensure that their 
preconditions and their consequences advance human dignity and social 
cohesion. This will have different implications in different contexts. But 
the principle idea – free trade in the service of development – must be an 
uncontested thematic commitment guiding a future EU-ACP Association 
Treaty for Development. No issue is more important in advancing this 
objective than the role of legal entitlements and of regulatory governance in 
advancing a development-favorable market economy. Both topics are 
highly undervalued and underestimated across most of the ACP Group of 
States. Yet, no international free trade can succeed without such a domestic 
basis: legal entitlements, including land owning rights, are often contested 
and more often underestimated in ACP states. And no development 
regionalism or national program will work without the proper 
understanding and sector-specific implementation of enforceable regulatory 
mechanisms of governance, including the establishment of independent 
agencies, anti-trust policies and agencies, and control mechanisms to 
prevent an excessive use of public subsidies; this is set of issues highly 
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underrated in most ACP countries although it is exactly in these fields 
where the EU is strongest in the pursuit of its own Single Market. 
Second, a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development must not 
only be in accordance with WTO norms. It must also facilitate the 
promotion of multilateral solutions for development-conscious free trade 
arrangements. One of the test cases for the future impact of the EU-ACP 
grouping will be the degree to which it can promote inclusive multilateral 
solutions, unblocking barriers, prejudices and shadow debates among 
industrial as well as among emerging and poor countries. If the EU-ACP 
grouping can contribute to a factual graduation of global economic 
governance under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization it will 
truly serve the purpose of a better world for all. This would entail the need 
for the EU to ensure that any other trade arrangement it is advancing – 
especially the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) –
takes into consideration implications for its ACP partners. Both the EU and 
the ACP countries must formulate reciprocal insurances that any other 
trade deal each of them is pursuing bilaterally or in a regional context – 
including deals pursued with the US (by the EU) and with any of the 
BRICS countries (by any of the ACP countries) – is compatible with EU-
ACP norms and objectives. 
Third, a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development must step out 
of the shadow of the paranoia over Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA). Nothing has obsessed political actors and civil society activists 
more since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement than the EPA issue. 
Right or wrong, the myopic reduction of EU-ACP trade relations to the 
EPA’s has deeply undermined credibility, trust and, most importantly, 
perspective in EU-ACP matters. A future EU-ACP Association Treaty for 
Development – paving the way towards 2050 in a multipolar world – must 
leave the EPA issue behind, along with the self-righteousness and the scars 
attributable to past debates over this concept. EU-ACP relations need to 
mature into a fully-fledged multi-regional association around a 
comprehensive, innovative and attractive agenda which puts trade into 
perspective with development and political dialogue. This is the only 
reasonable way forward and will liberate new potential among EU and 
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ACP partners. To activate this potential, EU-ACP partners need to engage 
their respective business communities. An ACP-EU Business Forum could 
serve this purpose. It could also be instrumental in advocating and 
implementing investment in partner countries and innovative forms of 
technology transfer, such as those subsumed under the concept of “reverse 
innovation”.38 The bottom line is more than evident: All ACP countries 
need to facilitate private investment in clusters of technology-based 
innovation, value chains of production, vocational training and 
employment. 
3. Political dialogue: A future EU-ACP Association Treaty for 
Development must graduate into a mature understanding of political 
dialogue. Until now, the concept is mainly a semantic cover-up for 
conditionality criteria through which the EU sanctions bad governance 
practices among ACP countries. Norms that are only sanction-based remain 
weak. Legitimizing strength will only rise if norms are ‘owned’. For a 
serious EU-ACP political dialogue this implies the need to be uplifted to 
the level of an honest dialogue on substantial and reciprocal political 
issues. No doubt, governance issues in ACP countries are relevant; so are 
matters of conditionality as far as development cooperation and financial 
transactions are concerned. EU citizens hold their own institutions to 
account for tax payers-money transferred towards ACP member states. But, 
political dialogue must be reciprocal. EU-ACP consultations need to 
include a mutually engaging exchange of experiences and trends on all 
political aspects beyond the classical development and bilateral agenda. 
Broadening the agenda – i.e. to health and education, competition and 
innovation, monetary and migration – would also broaden the stakeholder 
community both in the EU and in the ACP Group of States.  
Why should EU home affairs experts not engage with their counterparts 
from the ACP Group of States under the umbrella of an ACP-EU Home 
Affairs Forum? Why should EU environmental activists not engage with 
their counterparts in the ACP under the umbrella of an ACP-EU 
Environmental Forum? Why should EU teachers, students and vocational 
 
38 See Vijay Govindarajan/Chris Trimble, Reverse Innovation: Create far from home, 
win everywhere, Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2012. 
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institutions not cooperate with partners among ACP states under the 
umbrella of an ACP-EU Education Forum? Why should EU inventors not 
compare notes with technology experts from ACP states under the umbrella 
of an ACP-EU Innovation Forum? 
Political dialogue, if done properly, should be the easiest way to move 
away from a paternalistic donor-recipient relationship towards a serious 
partnership. There is nothing wrong with continuing election observer 
missions in ACP states, especially if these states are in the process of 
consolidating democratic procedures and rule of law. But – to give one 
practical example – what prevents the EU from inviting ACP election 
observers to accompany the campaign for the European Parliament or for 
any national election in EU member states? 
By all standards, the EU-ACP political dialogue has to mature. This will 
require new formats in which EU and ACP policy makers, but also civil 
society and private sector representatives can exchange views on global 
political issues beyond the current frame of the ACP-EU Parliamentary 
Assembly. Its mandate remains confined to overseeing the implementation 
of the EU-ACP cooperation agenda, and rightly so. Beside the proposed 
sectoral fora, it might be a sensible idea to study the potential of a political 
EU-ACP human security format: Sharing strategic debates and comparing 
perspectives on global political issues could be initiated by academia. As a 
first step, an ACP-EU Security Network could bring together like-minded 
institutes and individual scholars from EU and ACP countries.  
It is essential for any serious EU-ACP political dialogue to cover the 
broadest possible agenda of contemporary issues, both the challenges and 
opportunities for either side. This includes human migration with all its 
complex aspects as well as issues of technology innovation and 
dissemination. Circular learning processes can be advanced through 
interactions which bring together civil society, the private sector, media 
and academia, political institutions and officials on all possible levels 
wherever the meaning of North-South and South-South interdependency is 
recognized.  
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A future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development should encourage 
such a multiplication of interactions and define the parameters to advance 
the avenues ahead. There can be no doubt that they will be filled with life 
over time. A future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development must 
address the most urgent issue of our time: the use of violence for political 
or religious ends. The deplorable absence of a global dialogue on matters of 
religion and of socio-cultural issues impacting political action and 
development achievements must come to an end. The misuse of religious 
norms to advocate or execute acts of violence against other citizens must be 
condemned as blasphemy but also analyzed in terms of its negative effect 
on sustainable development across the world.  
The EU and the ACP Group of States should be at the forefront of this 
debate – and bring it to the doorsteps of the United Nations. Religious 
extremism – today primarily deplorable in Muslim communities where 
radical interpretations of jihadi Islam have bred aggression and terrorism – 
is another form of political totalitarianism. Most EU and ACP societies 
have been victims of different forms of religious extremism. Hence, the 
EU-ACP grouping is well positioned to form a global alliance for non-
violence in the pursuit of public and private goods. 
VII. The future (II): accommodating regional particularities 
A legally binding contractual frame for a future EU-ACP Association 
Treaty for Development beyond 2020 should be linked to regionalized 
political strategies. Nothing prevents a future EU-ACP Association Treaty 
for Development from advancing complementary forms of interaction on 
the bi-regional level. In line with the Joint EU-Africa Strategic Partnership 
of 200739 and the Joint EU-Caribbean Strategy of 201340 the European 
Union is currently seeking to progress relations with the Pacific ACP 
region. This effort should lead to a comprehensive EU-Pacific Islands 
 
39 European Commission, Key Facts on the Africa-EU Strategy, online at: 
www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-367_en.htm; for documents and 
activities see: Africa-EU Partnership, online at: www.africa-eu-partnership.org/. 
40 European Commission, EU relations with the Caribbean, online at: 
www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-798_en.htm. 
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Forum (PIF) Strategy, this time avoiding the time-consuming and mistrust-
producing efforts to re-invent an artificial Pacific grouping of the EU’s 
liking by trying to prevent the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand. It 
has already highly debatable whether or not it was a good idea to redesign 
the Caribbean Community by inventing CARIFORUM as an EU partner 
thus hoping to accommodate the Dominican Republic and the ever more 
emerging Cuba, both of which are not CARICOM member states. 
Likewise, EPA negotiations with artificially designed groupings across 
Africa have not helped the EU to conclude comprehensive regional trade 
arrangements in Africa. In the Pacific ACP region, the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) is the most inclusive regional grouping at hand. Although it 
requires creativity, the EU should see PIF as its genuine partner grouping in 
the region without trying to side-line Australia and New Zealand.  
The European Union is not going to advance its global presence if it 
continues to aspire for regional entities which are formed according to its 
own immediate liking without recognizing regions the way they want to be 
on their own. Actor-ness as it stands must be accepted if the EU wants to 
maintain credibility and exert long-term influence. China, the US, Brazil, 
Russia, the United Arab Emirates, India, Japan and Turkey are also 
involved in courting regional groupings around the globe. To be perceived 
as a genuine global player, the EU has to mature beyond the post-colonial 
underpinnings of its ties to the ACP regions. It must take the regional 
groupings around the world seriously as they exist. It must seek to 
empower them as a tool of developmental regionalism while at the same 
time the EU must reckon with the interests of ‘developed’ countries in any 
given region. As a consequence, the EU must accept existing groupings 
seriously if they want to pursue further partnerships with other global 
actors. The EU should avoid being artificially ‘concerned’ about this 
multiplication of interactions. In most cases such interactions rather 
advance the potential of a multipolar world order.    
The European Union has pushed CARICOM to embrace the format of 
CARIFORUM (including Cuba and the Dominican Republic) as the partner 
for development policy dialogue with the EU. The incorporation of 
CARIFORUM as a directorate under the umbrella of the CARICOM 
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secretariat might be a pragmatic solution for the time being. But the EU 
should hardly be surprised if CARICOM were to initiate a somewhat 
similar bi-regional format with, i.e. the African Union or Mercosur. For 
CARICOM such a move might be an attractive way to increase options 
originating from its matured actor-capacity. Multiplying bi-regional 
formats will however confront any grouping with capacity-constraints, and 
not only in the Caribbean.  
Fiji, a Pacific ACP partner country of the EU, has initiated a debate about 
the architecture of Pacific regionalism through its founding of the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum (PIDF). Fiji understands PIDF as a way of 
reducing the influence of New Zealand and particularly, of Australia, while 
bringing new partners to the region. The ambition of Fiji, to see Australia 
and New Zealand leave the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is not realistic and 
would be counterproductive for the region. Pacific island states have 
already expressed mixed reactions to the establishment of PIDF. The EU 
should be interested in supporting complementarity between PIF and PIDF 
and therefore the possible attachment of PIDF as a sub-unit of the Pacific 
Island Forum could be a useful option. The PIDF could then serve as hub 
for PIF development partners, not only established ones such as the EU, 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, the US and Canada, but also new 
ones like India, China, Thailand or the United Arab Emirates. The EU 
should advocate PIDF membership for all of the Pacific overseas territories 
of EU member states (French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and 
Futuna, Pitcairn) if complementarity with PIF is to be achieved. However, 
any EU action should focus on strengthening the PIF as the key corner 
stone of Pacific region-building. In this context, the EU should make more 
use of existing good practices such as the EU-New Zealand Energy 
Partnership for the Pacific which has served several Pacific small island 
states since 2013.41 Technologically, it is a win-win situation for both the 
EU and New Zealand; it would also serve the interests of the European 
 
41 See: European External Action Service, Rollout of renewable energy in the Pacific 
under EU-NZ Partnership, online at:www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/new_zealand/ 
 press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140422_01_en.htm. 
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Union in the Pacific as there is still uncertainty about the best possible 
incentives to enhance value for EU money in the Pacific.  
Cooperation with the Pacific Islands Forum involves additional complexity 
because six of its member states recognize Taiwan while the other PIF 
member states recognize the People’s Republic of China as their diplomatic 
partner. As for the EU, it must clarify its mind as to whether it will just 
remain a development partner (even if it is the most privileged one 
providing the biggest amount of money) or if it wishes to mature its 
relationship with PIF (and likewise with CARICOM) into a comprehensive 
political one. In doing so, the EU must avoid overburdening its resources 
and underperforming at the same time, with a presence reduced to symbolic 
politics plus big gesture donor-politics. The evolution of the Pacific 
regional architecture should be of higher political interest to the EU as it 
implicitly involves geopolitical complexities of long-term relevance.     
Similar issues arise in Africa, particularly notable with regard to North 
Africa, especially the Maghreb region, currently the least integrated region 
in the world. For the EU, the only reasonable way forward is to follow the 
lead of the African Union in advocating sub-regional economic groupings 
across the continent (‘building-blocks’) even if this requires patience and 
flexibility for some time to come. But the EU needs to better recognize the 
actor-ness of these Regional Economic Communities (RECs) if it wants to 
remain in the driver’s seat as a privileged partner of the African Union.42   
Inter alia, this implies that the EU must take SADC seriously the way it is 
and search for ways to accommodate its industrial relations with South 
Africa which are complimentary to the general association with the other 
SADC members who are part of the ACP grouping. Tripartite cooperation 
between the EU, South Africa and SADC on technology matters should be 
the minimum possible form of innovative action.  
 
42 The Regional Economic Communities officially recognized by the African Union 
in an effort to rationalize regional integration activities across the continent are: 
Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Common Market of Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). 
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The right frame for bi-regional EU cooperation with individual ACP 
regional groupings is the concept of Strategic Partnerships. They can 
complement the legally binding contractual relationship between the EU 
and the complete ACP grouping under a future association agreement. 
Strategic Partnerships will remain largely political, more flexible and 
specifically targeted. But they shall operate on the understanding of 
supporting the overall set of norms and objectives which define the EU-
ACP legal framework. In doing so, the different layers of a legally-binding 
contractual relationship with the overall ACP Group of States, specific 
regional strategic partnerships with CARICOM, PIF, the AU and possibly 
African Regional Economic Communities, and targeted bilateral relations 
with individual ACP countries can interlock and mutually support each 
other. The EU can demonstrate its capacity to activate a set of 
multidimensional policy instruments in the service of connecting legal 
solidity, political strategy, economic pragmatism and technical flexibility. 
Daily politics and unfolding events will almost inevitably generate 
inconsistencies and contradictions. But the tool box for comprehensively 
graduating the relationship with its 79 ACP partners and the realities in 
their respective regions has to be outlined and communicated by the EU 
first. Only then, can the EU listen in a meaningful way to what its ACP 
partners suggest, including the make-up of sub-regional groupings and the 
links they envisage in the future EU-ACP association. It may well be that 
CARICOM genuinely favors CARIFORUM as the right instrument to 
partially accommodate Cuba and the Dominican Republic in its own space 
without granting them full membership. Yet, given its size and economic 
potential, it is not inconceivable that Cuba (11 million citizens) may 
develop into an issue for CARICOM (16 million citizens) similar to what 
China has become for ASEAN – both a partner and a challenge. For the 
EU, instead of complaining about the rising role of China or any other 
country in any given ACP region, the priority must be on honesty, 
consistency and complementarity in its dealing with self-assured partners. 
The EU must simply accept that they are increasingly diversifying their 
options yet knowing quiet well the prime importance of their ties with the 
European Union and its member states.  
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Here is a closer look at some specific issues relevant for EU relations with 
each of the ACP sub-regions: 
(a) African ACP region: Five essential African realities have to be 
addressed by the Africa-EU Partnership to enhance its complementarity 
with a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development. 
1. Africa has become a continent on the rise, however is still haunted by 
many challenges.43 Among the essential challenges of the emerging Africa 
is the need to focus on enhanced agricultural production through the better 
use of modern technology and by addressing issues of land-owning rights 
and inheritance matters including; by making better use of African soil and 
by preventing post-harvest losses; by addressing issues of how to advance 
agro-industry and a better marketing of African products, locally, 
regionally and globally. But above all other issues looms one challenge: 
Without a focus on formal job creation, African economic growth is not 
going to have a transformative and sustainable effect. Migration flows will 
intensify. Infrastructure development is one key tool in facilitating market 
creation and job promotion. As important is the better use of technological 
innovations for genuine and sustained African progress.44  
2. Africa is experiencing a rising middle class. But in too many countries, 
it is a middle class uncertain of its longer term stability. Fearing the 
fragility of unconsolidated progress, the ambition to migrate is often 
stronger than the optimism to invest into the future of one’s own society. 
The pull- and push factors of migration, their implication on Africa’s future 
and on the relationship with the European Union require highest political 
attention and a much more substantial deepening of studies to better 
understand the multidimensional aspects of this complex issue. 45  The 
 
43 Ludger Kühnhardt, Africa Consensus. New Interests, Initiatives, and Partners, 
Washington D.C./Baltimore, Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2014. 
44 See: Fondazione per la Collaborazione tra I Popoli/Foundation for World Wide 
Cooperation, Poverty Alleviation: A Role for Technology and Infrastructure?, 
Rome 2015.  
45 An EU-AU high level summit was held on November 11 and 12, 2015 in La 
Valetta with a focus on discussing root causes and implication of migration inside 
Africa and towards Europe. The newly founded African Regional Integration 
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optimistic approach to migration is usually focusing on the positive effects 
of remittances for the maintenance of so many families across Africa. But 
remittances alone will not break the cycle of poverty, asymmetries and 
fragility. Remittances need to be used as a potential for investment and job 
creation in Africa. 46  At the same time, vocational training needs to be 
enhanced and investment promoted. But in the end, only solid, lasting and 
competitively paid jobs across Africa will turn the African middle class 
into a protector of African stability. Jobs are created by private investors 
and the market. Political frames, including those addressed by EU-ACP 
tools, can be only of a supporting or enabling nature. Much greater priority 
must be given to political mechanisms which facilitate job creation by the 
private sector across Africa. 
3. African political transformation has focused too much on elections and 
not enough on the period between elections. However, it is during those 
days of normalcy that the deficits of African governance and regulation 
become pertinent. Political modernization of African orders needs to 
address the issue of leadership circulation (the Mo Ibrahim Prize is the 
most impressive private initiative to this day in this regard). It also must 
cope with problems of resilience in the pursuit of domestic orders of rule of 
law. One all-pervasive characteristic which is predominant across Africa: 
there are too many strategies and too little effort to implement them. The 
Africa-EU Partnership must better contribute to supporting implementation 
mechanisms across its priority areas. 
4. Political modernization needs to prioritize the problem of residual 
statehood and the deficits in the realization of the monopoly of legitimate 
use of force in the most vulnerable and failed African states. Shared 
 
Studies Association (ARISA) is currently conducting a multi-annual project on the 
different dimensions of migration.  
46 See Olawale I. Maiyegun, Remittances: How to activate the potential of the 
Diaspora, in: Ablam Benjamin Akoutou, Rike Sohn, Matthias Vogl, Daniel Yeboah 
(eds.), Migration and Civil Society as Development Drivers – a Regional 
Perspective, WAI-ZEI Paper, No. 23, Praia: West Africa Institute/Bonn: Center for 
European Integration Studies, 2015, pp. 153-173; online at: 
www.westafricainstitute.org/index.php/en/2012-11-08-18-10-01/2012-11-15-18-
40-40. 
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security concerns should be a priority of EU-ACP policies in respect to 
Africa. Since 2004, the EU has contributed more than one billion euro to 
the African Peace and Security Architecture. Further support, especially 
improving the operational capacities of AU peace keeping and intervention 
brigades, remains in the interest of the EU. The past two decades have 
demonstrated how much Africa owes to a peaceful and secure environment 
and how fast the promise of peace, stability and security can break down 
again. The speed at which a presumably stable constellation – in societal 
interactions as much as in the realm of structured politics – can break down 
is hardly as stunning anywhere else as in the African context.  
5. The Regional Economic Communities under the umbrella of the 
African Union are meant to support the economic integration of Africa and 
to facilitate Africa’s inclusion in the world economy. The Africa-EU 
Partnership needs to address understanding for the complexity of 
advancing economic and potentially also monetary integration (as aimed 
for by the East African Community). Too much rhetoric and too little 
sensitivity for obstacles and preconditions of regional integration cloud the 
EU-Africa documents. The EU and the AU must more intensively engage 
in a strategic economic reflection on the strength and flaws of the two 
currency unions in West (UEMOA) and Central (CEMAC) Africa. Both 
currency unions are idiosyncratic left-overs of French colonialism, 
representing monetary union without economic integration – untenable if 
Africa and its Regional Economic Communities want to acquire a fully self-
determined and functioning space in the global economy. The ongoing 
upheavals and uncertainties in the Arab North African region cannot be 
excluded from the Africa-EU Partnership. Aside from breaking many 
taboos about homogeneity and transformation in the Arab world, the Arab 
upheavals have dismantled the perception of an artificial barrier dividing 
North Africa from sub-Saharan Africa – as much as migration pressure on 
Europe has dismantled the illusion of the Mediterranean being an 
unbreakable barrier between a fortress Europe and its unstable 
neighborhood. The EU-Africa relationship needs to recognize that the 
traditional boundaries between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa have 
become permeable, of not superfluous. A more serious reflection needs to 
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take the unity in diversity of the whole African continent – including its 
North African component – into consideration without denying the 
specifics of each region of the continent. 
Governance and security challenges do not differ too much in North Africa 
and in sub-Sahara Africa. Issues of identity and recognition are shared 
across the continent. The same is true for the need to enhance 
infrastructure, production chains and jobs. Instead of competing over 
relations with China, it would be helpful and mature to advance tripartite 
cooperation of the EU, its African partners and China in the promotion of 
production chains, vocational training activities, rule-based regulatory 
governance structures and sustainable job creation. Cooperation in Africa 
with the United States must recognize their abilities in fighting terror and 
enhancing security operations. At the same time, it will be useful to engage 
the US also in dialogue and cooperation over technology exchange and the 
agenda related to facilitate drivers of change and innovation across Africa. 
(b) Caribbean ACP region: Five essential features of the Caribbean 
ACP region have to be addressed by the Caribbean-EU Partnership to 
enhance its complementarity with a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for 
Development.  
1. Most of the Caribbean ACP countries are stable parliamentary 
democracies. Yet they are vulnerable because of size, geography, climate 
and economic structures. This is a particular challenge for the microstates 
organized in the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS, 
ranging from St. Lucia with 175,000 inhabitants to Montserrat with 6,000 
inhabitants). The Caribbean-EU Partnership must address the particular 
vulnerabilities of small island states which are affecting food security and 
health, education and job creation, and the overall enhancement of 
economic value chains. The focus must be on methods aimed at 
overcoming one-dimensional dependencies on tourism or export of raw 
materials. Regional economic integration and a more resilient inclusion 
into regional and global market chains are essential elements of a 
sustainable strategy for the region in coping with its particular 
vulnerabilities. Improving regulatory governance ought to be a key feature 
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in order to make better use of public and private sector potential across the 
member states of CARICOM and the OECS. 
2. Cuba’s transformation opens new avenues for cooperation across the 
Caribbean basin. Most Caribbean ACP countries have traditionally good 
and intensive ties with Cuba. They always appreciated Cuba’s support in 
health and education matters. The end of the US embargo against Cuba is 
understood in most of the Caribbean as the correction of a historical wrong. 
Yet, the pan-Latin American orientation of Cuba – not the least defined by 
linguistic bonds – receives mixed feelings among CARICOM and OESC 
states. As much as they welcome the better use of cooperation with Latin 
America, Cuba included, they remain cautious not to end up in a situation 
where the specific conditions of their own island status are neglected.  
3. No other ACP region includes so many EU overseas territories as the 
Caribbean. 47  The recent re-organization of the Dutch Antilles (Bonaire, 
Sint Eustatius, Saba and Sint Marten now EU territories as special 
communities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Aruba and Curacao 
as autonomous countries [landen] of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) 
requires a comprehensive reconceptualization of the ‘neighborhood 
dimension’ of EU-Caribbean relations. Visa waiver decisions have already 
sensitized some Caribbean states to reflect on EU migration policies at 
large. But beyond the issue of circular migration or the control of external 
EU borders, matters of sustainable tourism, maritime research and 
technology transfer need to advance on the EU-Caribbean agenda.   
4. The EU and its Caribbean ACP partners need to promote innovation 
throughout the wider region by initiating an EU-ACP Innovation Forum – 
preferably with a focus on energy – to also include private market actors 
from the US and Canada as well as from interested countries of Latin 
America. The objective must be to find innovative forms of production and 
its related service industries to substantially increase the integration of the 
Caribbean basin in the global economic value chain, along with a solid 
 
47 France: Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guyana, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin; 
Great Britain: Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos, Bermuda, Anguilla, Montserrat, 
British Virgin Islands; Kingdom of the Netherlands: Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, Sint 
Martin, Sint Eustatius, Saba. 
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increase in private investment into jobs in the Caribbean. It is here that the 
EU and its Caribbean partners will find ample room for cooperation with 
market actors of the US and private as well as public actors from China, but 
also from India and Brazil.   
5. The Caribbean region is exposed to complex problems of infrastructure, 
both within its island states as well as between them. The particular 
challenges to enhance connectivity across the maritime region should be a 
priority for EU-Caribbean cooperation, reaching from hurricane disaster 
cooperation to regulatory norms for tariff-free maritime transportation 
across the Caribbean Common Market. The Caribbean region is the most 
appropriate area to emulate the positive effects of an Integrated Maritime 
Policy developed in the European Union under the leadership of former EU 
Commissioner Joe Borg (2004-2010). In this context (and in its own right), 
the legal structure of the Caribbean integration schemes – especially the 
role of the CARICOM Court of Justice – ought to be strengthened through 
a more focused strategic cooperation with the EU.  
(c) Pacific ACP region: Five priorities for developments in the Pacific 
ACP region have to be addressed by a Pacific-EU Partnership to enhance 
its complementarity with a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for 
Development.48 
1. The Pacific islands diseconomies of scale require an applied use of 
technology and infrastructure to enhance life chances for its populations49. 
Adequate Pacific islands fishing fleets and better forms of processing and 
marketing are of the essence, coupled with the readiness of the EU to open 
its market to tuna genuinely fished and processed by Pacific island 
countries. This strategy alone will generate more jobs and income 
 
48 For a critical assessment of the current EU-Pacific ACP constellation see Geert 
Laporte/Gemma Piῆol Puig, Reinventing Pacific-EU relations: with or without the 
ACP?, ECDPM, Briefing Note, No. 56, Brussels: European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, 2013.  
49 On the overall situation of Pacific island states see: Graham Hassall, ‘Including the 
Excluded in Global Politics’: The Pacific Island Micro-states and global politics 
(2011), online at: www.academia.edu/564772/_Inclidung_Small_Iland_States_ 
 in_Global_Politics.  
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opportunities in Pacific island states. Smart new initiatives in the field of 
human development are also needed, such as medical ships regularly 
calling on all of the islands of Pacific island countries, where normally only 
the capital island benefits from more or less appropriate health facilities. 
The EU must target its development programs by better (and more 
efficiently) linking them to tripartite cooperation with New Zealand, 
Australia, Korea, Japan, the US, and China and Taiwan respectively. The 
EU should support the establishment and contribute to the consolidation of 
Trust Funds for the smallest and most vulnerable Pacific island states; it 
should also participate in the existing US Trust Fund for Marshall Islands 
(to expire in 2023) and the Tuvalu Trust Fund.  
2. The EU ought to enhance its intellectual and physical presence in the 
region with the aim of better explaining the rationale for EU interests in the 
Pacific. As the EU provides roughly one billion euro per year to the Pacific 
island states, it can generally expect the support of the Pacific island 
countries on global political issues, including in the context of UN debates 
on crises such as in the Ukraine or in Syria. The EU presence in the Pacific 
ought to include intellectual dialogues on matters such as land rights or 
maritime resources and border management issues based on related EU 
experiences. If seen through the lens of their maritime economic and 
political potential, small island economies turn into big ocean states. The 
Pacific-EU Partnership must enhance the knowledge and understanding in 
Europe of ocean economies, beyond the usual focus on climate change. 
Underwater resources such as phosphate and manganese are of enormous 
relevance for the future of mankind; hence all maritime dimensions in the 
Pacific and Indian Ocean should become of greater interest to Europeans, 
including EU scientific and research activities. 
3. Hardly any other region is so existentially affected by climate change. 
The atoll states of Kiribati, Tuvalu and Marshall Islands (along with the 
Maldives in the Indian Ocean) with a maximum height of two meters above 
current sea levels are most threatened by inundation and the inability to 
continue living on these islands. Often, it seems, the atoll countries have 
become famous for being soon-to-be-extinguished species. While it is true 
that Kiribati has already bought land in Fiji as a precautious measure for 
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the possible relocation of its people50, for the leadership of the atoll states 
relocation is no real option. Primarily, they want to use their new 
bargaining power concerning international climate change in order to 
enhance the resilience of their existing habitats through more and targeted 
international assistance, coupled with better access for their own and 
locally processed maritime products to global markets. Better life chances 
in the traditional environment are clearly favored in most Pacific island 
states. The EU must recognize and understand how sensitive the debate on 
‘climate refugees’ could become. Local leaders in atoll countries feel 
humiliated when confronted with this term as they are not responsible for 
global climate change. Possible recipient countries of Pacific relocations 
also struggle with the implications of sovereignty matters, as it remains 
unclear whether or not relocated communities would properly integrate into 
local society or preserve their own identity (which is their prime interest) 
against the will of a possible recipient society such as Fiji. The simple 
creation of a new legal term under international law does not resolve the 
conceptual and possibly political implications.  
4. The new geopolitical awakening regarding the nature and role of 
Pacific island states and their maritime exclusive zones – both as source of 
resources, as transit spaces and as a geopolitical spring board for strategic 
rivalries – cannot fail to be of interest to the EU. China’s rising ambition to 
expand trade and policy links across the region, paralleled by Indian 
ambitions of the same nature, led to a new geopolitical race for influence in 
the Pacific. EU-Pacific ACP partners could engage other actors in the 
wider region to contemplate a mechanism similar to the ASEAN Regional 
Forum; a Pacific Regional Forum under the umbrella of the Pacific Islands 
Forum with a focus on security and strategic matters, may enhance the 
perspectives of multilateralism in the region, whose Northern part suffers 
the most from the absence of any form of security architecture. All forms 
of possible cooperation between the EU, its Pacific partners, China, India, 
the ASEAN countries, Korea, Japan, the US, Australia and New Zealand 
should be explored to advance a stable and secure environment for peace 
and development.  
 
50 See Guyon Espiner, To be Pacific, in: Listener, May 9, 2015, p. 30.  
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5. Contested regional concepts for Pacific region-building should be 
addressed and managed through proactive and flexible reactions of the EU 
and its Pacific ACP partners. Fiji’s ambition to replace the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) with a Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) (without 
Australia and New Zealand, but with a genuine role for Pacific 
development partners, including the EU) should enhance the EU’s interest, 
as a leading cooperation partner of the region, to raise its voice in favor of 
anything that strengthens the Pacific Islands Forum. The complimentary 
inclusion of the PIDF under the umbrella of the Pacific Islands Forum 
should be the option favored by the EU. This alone would be realistic, save 
resources and strengthen the actor-ness of the Pacific island states in their 
region and beyond. The focus of PIDF on the private sector and civil 
society participation could serve as a welcomed upgrading of the profile of 
PIF. Any efforts, however, to undermine PIF by way of promoting PIDF as 
alternative Pacific regional architecture would only be detrimental to both 
groupings. In order to reinforce this position, the EU should channel all of 
its development cooperation with the Pacific ACP countries through the 
Pacific Islands Forum.  
(d) The European Union: Five priorities are essential if the EU wants to 
make better use of the new opportunities originating from a combined 
future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development and EU-regional A 
and C and P strategic partnerships. 
1. The EU needs to become more political in its language, more strategic 
in its outlook and more result-oriented in its ambition. For now, EU foreign 
policy strategies, development policies included, are too process-driven, 
too fluid in their language and anticipate too much global consensus rather 
than outlining EU interests. The EU needs to enhance the degree of 
complementarity and coherence between the different layers of its relations 
with the ACP Group of States, the ACP sub-groups and other relations 
affected directly or indirectly by EU-ACP policies (i.e. Australia, New 
Zealand, North African countries, Latin American countries, the US). 
2. The EU needs to broaden stakeholder support for ACP and sub-regional 
activities through thematic engagement with respective professional and 
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public groups across the EU. The EU-ACP agenda (as much as the agenda 
of regional particularities with ACP sub-regional partners) needs to be 
broadened beyond the traditional community of development or regional 
experts and advocacy groups. This is the only way forward in times of 
populism and parochialism to generate new interest in the strategic 
importance and potential of cooperation with the diverse spheres of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific partner societies. 
3. The EU must identify new thematic engagements with ACP sub-
regions rooted in European enlightened self-interest. Neither the language 
of self-negation nor a bullish approach will serve the projection of EU 
reputation and presence around the globe. A sober formulation of self-
interest is much more honest and will guarantee better links with the 
broader domestic agenda inside the European Union.  
4. The EU needs to advance new contributions to global multilateralism 
through functioning regional arrangements which contribute to global 
public goods. To initiate a Pacific Security Architecture could serve this 
objective while simultaneously demonstrating the potential of the Pacific-
EU Partnership. Regarding the Africa-EU Partnership, new impulses 
should be given to advance concepts of circular migration. As for the 
Caribbean-EU Partnership, new forms of tripartite cooperation with the 
US and/or Mexico on energy and environmental issues should be 
developed. In all the three ACP regions, smart joint cooperation with China 
– itself focusing on investment in infrastructure – should be sought pro-
actively in order to contribute to sustainable forms of employment in the 
global South.  
5. The EU’s focus on bi-regional partnerships must be anchored in a clear 
set of universal norms and values. This is where the proposal for a new and 
bold EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development comes in. A future EU-
ACP Association Treaty for Development needs to be based on commonly 
agreed norms, values and objectives in order to live up to the expectations 
of EU foreign policy making in general. Based on a legally binding 
contractual agreement, a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for 
Development will be a supportive element for the evolution of international 
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law, so often under pressure in current times of uncertainty.  A test-case for 
the coherence and added-value of this approach will be the way in which 
EU-ACP relations – jointly and through regional strategic partnerships – 
help to shape the new UN Sustainable Development Goals. These goals, 
agreed upon in September 2015 by the UN General Assembly, are a noble 
list of fine promises. But they lack focus and at times a reasonable sense of 
priority and clarification about ends and means. They are still radiating the 
spirit of social engineering instead of an honest political discourse about 
existing conflicts of aims and prevailing differences over policy 
preferences around the globe. The EU and the ACP Group of States should 
take issue with these deficits and contribute to a better focus, a more honest 
sense of obstacles and required preconditions to make the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals work in reality. The EU and the ACP Group of States 
should become advocates of an honest and forward-looking debate about 
the way ahead. Such a contribution would add global value to the very 
existence of a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development.  
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VIII. The future (III): prioritizing UN Sustainable 
Development Goals 
The UN Sustainable Development Goals promulgated in September 2015 
include a long and full set of nice, noble and important objectives.51 The 
main problem with the seventeen goals and their specifications is the 
absence of binding implementation mechanisms. Who does not wish for a 
better world without poverty and human suffering? But the United Nations 
has not reached any serious level of global governance with enforceable 
mechanisms facilitating the realization of the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals. Conflicting aims and clashing interests will continue to accompany 
the global community in the years and decades ahead. It is at this 
crossroads that a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development must 
do better to genuinely gain legitimacy, credibility and visibility. For 
decades, EU and ACP partner countries have experimented with the 
daunting search to prioritize global policy objectives, to streamline 
 
51 Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere; Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food 
security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; Goal 3: 
Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; Goal 4: Ensure 
inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all; Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and 
girls; Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and 
sanitation for all; Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy for all; Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all; Goal 9: 
Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization 
and foster innovation; Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries; 
Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and 
sustainable; Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns; 
Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; Goal 14: 
Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development; Goal 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial 
ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and 
reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss; Goal 16: Promote peaceful and 
inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and 
build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; Goal 17: 
Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for 
sustainable development. For further details see: United Nations Sustainable 
Development Knowledge Platform, online at: www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org. 
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implementation measures and to optimize monitoring. A future EU-ACP 
Association Treaty for Development must react to the mistakes made and 
the insights gained. It must address the need for enforceable regulatory 
governance mechanisms to make its own objectives come true. The first 
priority is to prioritize the right set of priorities instead of declaring every 
issue a priority. Five themes could be addressed in the preamble which 
would distinguish future EU-ACP policy objectives from the language and 
conceptualization of the UN Sustainable Development Goals if EU and 
ACP partners take their words, norms and experience seriously:  
1. Human dignity has to be identified as the center of any legitimate and 
sustainable social order; the notion of human dignity is normatively 
superior to any abstract social modelling in the definition of development 
and any abstract notion of humankind’s progress. By definition, the 
promotion of human dignity requires the unequivocal rejection of all forms 
of violence and political or religious extremism disrespecting the integrity 
of the life of others. 
2. Rule of law has to be identified as the prime objective to succeed with 
the implementation of any public policy objective; the fact that rule of law 
depends on preconditions and is subject to interpretational diversity does 
not undermine its primacy over any other social order. Rule of law is meant 
to serve the weaker parts of the society by providing a binding frame 
against misuse, dominance and exploitation of any sort, including the 
preservation of any kind of economic, social or political monopolies.  
3. Good governance has to be recognized as the principle public tool for 
enabling and supporting a flourishing and free society; the fact that good 
governance has become a shallow international mantra accommodating 
highly diverse implications does not belittle its importance. Good 
governance depends on those preconditions which allow societal pluralism 
to flourish based on mutual respect and reciprocal recognition of rights, 
especially those related to inalienable integrity of life, conscience and 
expression, including religious freedom. 
4. Justice and fairness have to be identified as principle criteria for 
measuring a socially responsible market economy; a market economy can 
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be socially responsible only if it is framed by solid forms of regulatory 
governance in order to get policy objectives implemented in a complex and 
transnational environment. Multi-regional free-trade arrangements can 
contribute to a better use of the economic potential of all countries and 
societies around the globe. But those trade arrangements shaped by the 
leading industrialized regions in the world must show more sensitivity to 
the particular vulnerabilities of less developed and emerging economies. 
5. Respect for the integrity of nature and the plurality of cultural identities 
have to be identified as preconditions for human survival and happiness; 
for the time being, ecological consciousness seems to be more universally 
accepted that the plurality of cultural (including religious and ethnic) 
identities. 
A future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development will only step out of 
the shadow of obscurity, being both relatively unknown and undervalued, if 
it can substantially contribute to the advancement of public goods for all.  
Thus it can dissolve barriers between the North and the South, the rich and 
the poor, the big and the small. In doing so, it will dismantle stereotypes 
about the deficits in human interaction under conditions of globality. Any 
such approach requires consensus on policy priorities. To move beyond a 
development-driven donor-recipient relationship, the EU and all ACP 
countries need to commonly identify public goods and political instruments 
which they together wish to advance for the sake of the global community. 
The five priorities outlined above should be promoted by a future EU-ACP 
Association Treaty for Development as universal in their meaning yet as 
particularly appropriate for application and specification in the context of 
all EU and ACP countries and societies.  
Future EU-ACP cooperation in the framework of the United Nations may 
become the most important global presence of the association partners. In 
past decades, EU-ACP cooperation has not really affected their respective 
projection of interests and actions in the United Nations context. As much 
as a future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development needs to get third 
parties involved for tripartite forms of cooperation on issues of relevance in 
a local or regional context, a strategic upgrading of the EU-ACP 
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relationship must translate into a more visible strategic presence in the 
United Nations system. In doing so, EU-ACP institutional mechanisms 
must be strengthened beyond the current primarily bilateral set up of 
meetings and summits. EU-ACP coordination within the UN system needs 
to find its own structure, possibly installing an EU-ACP coordination office 
in the premises of the EU Delegation to the United Nations. In doing so, 
the EU will have to accept the desire of ACP countries to independently 
engage with other partners worldwide, too. In support of this attitude, the 
EU should advocate an enhanced observer status in the United Nations of 
the leading regional groupings in the ACP regions – just along the lines of 
the upgraded EU observer status. The EU needs to develop much more 
strategic creativity in promoting topics and positions in the UN system 
which the EU shares with its ACP partners.  
IX. What to realistically expect from the EU-ACP 
negotiations ahead?  
Following the logic of the Lisbon Treaty provisions, the European Union is 
trying to somewhat balance representative and deliberative elements of 
democratic agenda-setting in the process of preparing and pursuing EU-
ACP negotiations. On a political level, the prospects for a post-Cotonou 
Agreement were discussed for the first time in spring 2015 by all EU 
Commissioners dealing with external actions of the EU (including trade, 
development and foreign and security affairs). In 2015, the European 
Commission organized a Consultation, engaging stakeholders, scholars, 
NGO activists and others, primarily in several workshops and via the 
internet. This reflection process on a post-Cotonou Agreement was more 
public, transparent and serious than any efforts prior to previous 
negotiations between Europe and its ACP partners. It led to the publication 
of a Final Report in July 201552, followed by a Green Paper in October 
 
52 European Commission. Final Report: ACP-EU Relations after 2020: Issues for the 
EU in consultation phase 1 (July 2015), online at: www.eesc.europa.eu 
/?i=portal.en.rex-opinions.37215. 
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2015.53 Because of shared competencies defined by the Lisbon Treaty, the 
EU-ACP dossier is handled jointly by the DG Development and 
Cooperation (DEVCO) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
A Communication by the European Commission (indicating the way 
forward and probably the negotiation framework) will be followed by EU 
Council Conclusions and by a proposal for a Council Decision which will 
define the precise mandate for the formal opening of negotiations. By then, 
at the latest, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and several 
committees of the European Parliament involved with different aspects of a 
post-Cotonou Agreement will – and hopefully must – become engaged, 
possibly with echoes in the wider public across the European Union.   
As for the ACP Group of States, their 2016 Summit in Port Moresby paved 
the way for future negotiations with the EU. However, given the weak 
structure of the ACP Group of States, the influence and impact of the 
manifold positions across the wide spectrum of countries and their 
respective political preferences makes it unlikely to substantially redefine 
any parameters of negotiation once they are proposed by the European 
Union. The relationship between the EU and the ACP Group of States 
remains asymmetric and hence contradictory. All the more, the ACP Group 
of States needs advocacy support within the European Union.  
Formal negotiations between the EU and the ACP Group of States may not 
commence before 2017 or 2018 (which some experts consider too late to 
seriously initiate a truly innovative agreement). This will leave only a short 
period of time for the successful conclusion of negotiations (including 
approval by the European Parliament and the EU Council, followed by the 
ratification process in all EU member states) before the beginning of the 
next election campaign to the European Parliament in early 2019 and the 
establishment of the next EU Commission in late 2019. Furthermore, the 
current financial base for EU-ACP relations will expire in late 2020, while 
a possible merger between the European Development Fund (EDF) – the 
 
53 European Commission. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Consultation Paper. Towards a new partnership between the 
European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020 
(October 2015), online at: www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/103015. 
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main financial instrument for EU-ACP activities – and the general EU 
budget – which has been a long-standing demand by the European 
Parliament (‘budgetization of the EDF’) – needs to take place before the 
next fiscal frame for the period 2021-2027 can be formalized.        
On the EU side, the EU bureaucracy will dominate the practical 
negotiations for a follow-up to the current Cotonou Agreement (which, as 
this paper advocates, should lead to an EU-ACP Association Treaty for 
Development): about twenty DGs and services were already involved in the 
first stages of the preparatory process in 2015, along with all member states 
who are party to a possible “mixed” agreement54, and interested members 
of the European Parliament. It should be assumed that EU partner countries 
who are outside the Cotonou Agreement, but affected by it – such as the 
countries of Latin America and the remaining eight least developed 
countries who are not members of the ACP – will also want to be 
consulted. Until the last moment, the process will be as rigorous as it is 
daunting and complex. In order to be more visible, the EU-ACP agenda 
needs to be introduced to wider domestic political debates and ought also to 
become an issue for parliamentary debates on the EU level as well as in EU 
member states. Given the dynamics of institutional processes in the 
European Union, it is realistic to assume that the negotiating position of the 
institutions of the European Union on the future of EU-ACP relations 
beyond 2020 will remain tied to the three priorities currently defined by the 
Cotonou Agreement. For this reason it is all the more important to sharpen 
these categories substantially:    
Aid: The classical Cotonou agenda still exists. Aid to remedy poverty 
remains an issue echoed by the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals. 
Nevertheless, the challenge for the EU and its ACP partners will be to add 
value to the very notion of development, beyond the simplistic focus on 
GDP and criteria such as those of the Human Development Index. After all, 
the industrialized Northern hemisphere also includes developing countries 
 
54 Meaning that a post-Cotonou agreement will fall both under EU competencies in 
the area of trade and development aid as well as under national prerogative rights, 
thus requiring approval of the EU organs and ratification in all 28 EU member 
states. 
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in their own way. Only a universal and inclusive definition of development 
can be appropriate in the age of globality.55  
Trade: Bi-regional arrangements toward free trade can facilitate success in 
the global promotion of free trade and a return to structured multilateralism 
beyond the Doha round and the Bali process. Whether or not the ACP-EU 
format as such can contribute in any way to a consolidated and pragmatic 
multilateralism is debatable. 56  Certainly, regional groupings across the 
three ACP regions can play a growing role in the years ahead. 57  But 
whatever the practical conclusion for balancing ACP and ACP regional 
aspects, the EU must take existing regional groupings within the ACP 
regions more seriously just the way they are. Moreover, the EU and the 
ACP Group of States must jointly recognize the usefulness of bi-regional 
(TTIP) or multi-regional (TPP) trade agreements. In the absence of a global 
free trade agreement, such bi- or multi-regional activities contribute to 
setting norms and standards for a more liberalized world economy. In the 
end, this serves the poor of the world more than new forms of 
protectionism or ideological anti-capitalism. China, obviously, has a more 
pragmatic understanding of these matters than several countries of the ACP 
Group of States. Also therefore, tripartite cooperation with China on 
investment projects, infrastructure measures and efforts to generate 
sustainable employment is useful and constructive.  
Political dialogue: The term is as broad as it is inconclusive. It could touch 
upon the classical notion and idea of development – including issues of 
 
55 See Dayo Olopade, Forget ‘developing’. Fat nations must go lean, in: International 
New York Times, March 1-2, 2014, p. 6. 
56 See Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu/Francis Shasha Matambalya (eds.). Trade Relations 
between the EU and Africa: Development, Challenges and Options beyond the 
Cotonou Agreement, London/New York: Routledge, 2010; James Nyomakawa-
Obimpeh, Time for a New Generation of Trade Agreements between the EU and 
ACP Countries?, TEPSA Brief, Brussels: Trans European Policy Studies 
Association (TEPSA), 2012, online at: www.tepsa.eu/download/ 
TEPSA%20brief%20by%20James%20Nyomakwa-Obimpeh_15022012.pdf. 
57 Ludger Kühnhardt, Region-Building, Vol. I: The Global Proliferation of Regional 
Integration; Vol. II: The Documents, Oxford/New York: Berghahn Books, 2010; 
Mario Telò, European Union and New Regionalism. Competing Regionalism and 
Global Governance in a post-Hegemonic Era, Farnham: Ashgate, 2014. 
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good governance and their preconditions – but it could also go beyond and 
promote reflections on the management of a global order which includes 
freedom and authority, rule of law and basic rights, a human centered 
understanding of development, human security and sustainable peace. 
Whether the EU-ACP format can contribute to this reflection, again, 
depends on the readiness of both sides to engage in a bold joint political 
effort which goes beyond suspicion (translated into variants of 
conditionality on the EU side) and rhetoric grand-standing (with 
predictable alternative options on the ACP side).  
In any case, the EU and the ACP Group of States need to broaden their 
stakeholder communities for a fresh beginning. The twofold dilemma 
which the EU and the ACP Group of States are facing is easier to describe 
than to overcome: The EU needs to broaden its stakeholder community 
beyond those active in the development community and its related civil 
society and academic activists if the debate on the global relevance of a 
future EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development is to have any impact 
under current political constellations across the EU. By the same logic, the 
ACP Group of States needs to engage more players – officials, the private 
sector and civil society activists – within and among countries across a 
huge territory and a vast set of agendas, in order to regain respect and be 
taken seriously by anybody beyond the donor community. Streamlining 
priorities internally, reaching out to a broader public and subsequently 
coming to terms with each other – nobody has ever suggested that the 
challenges ahead in advancing relations between the EU and the ACP 
Group of States would be easy. Whether or not the EU and the ACP can 
draw diplomatic capital and economic benefits from the potential 
opportunities of the future ACP-EU Association for Development depends 
on the leadership and political will of the actors involved in the upcoming 
negotiations. But the private sector, civil society groups and intellectuals 
have their role to play, too.  
The end of the post-colonial era compels the EU to globalize its strategic 
orientation, linking traditional development concerns and trade interests 
with geopolitical and security considerations. A whole set of issues lies 
ahead of the EU; most importantly, currently, in terms of economic content 
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and strategic consequence is the positive outcome of negotiations with the 
United States on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
But the EU is well advised not to neglect other issues of long-term 
importance and substantial relevance for its global credibility. A renewed 
EU partnership with the ACP Group of States – and, moreover, efforts to 
achieve an Association Treaty for Development with the ACP Group of 
States – covers a substantial set of issues, regions and actors relevant for 
advancing a stable multipolar world order.  
Trying to graduate the EU-ACP relationship from a post-colonial forum 
into a sincere element of global economic and political governance – 
compatible with the WTO and with the UN, and yet with a special focus on 
a human-centered development agenda – is worth the effort. The outcome 
of this process will define a substantial component in pursuing a new 
multipolar and stable world order. In the final analysis, a bold maturing of 
EU-ACP relations is of strategic importance for a world full of uncertainty.  
For the time being, only one thing is certain: The Cotonou Agreement, the 
foundation for a structured multidimensional relationship between the 
European Union and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states will expire 
on February 28, 2020. It should be replaced by a bold, strategically 
revamped, legally binding and future-oriented EU-ACP Association Treaty 
for Development. The time is ripe for such maturing of relations between 
the global North and the global South. 
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